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Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer
Russell Korobkin* & Chris Guthrie**
Given the high cost of litigation,' it is not surprising that most law-
suits settle out of court prior to adjudication. But the rate of settlement is
extraordinarily high-approximately ninety to ninety-five percent or more
of civil lawsuits not dismissed by courts in the early stages of litigation
settle short of trial.2
* Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law and University of Illinois Institute
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1. Financial costs include both out-of-pocket expenses-legal fees and expert witness fees, among
other costs-and the "monetary value of the time clients spend on cases." David M. Tmbek et al., The
Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 91 (1983). Generally speaking, the further a case
progresses through the system, the higher the costs incurred-increased legal fees (at least if attorneys
charge on an hourly basis), trial fees (including expert witness fees, stenographic costs, and travel
expenses), and client time away from work. See id. at 104-06; cf id. at 91 (listing the average amount
of time lawyers spent on each step of the litigation process). Trials cost so much more than settlement
that some theorists comparing the two assume the costs of settling to be equal to zero. See, e.g.,
Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution,
27 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 1067, 1075 (1989).
The psychic costs of trials are also notoriously high. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Day After
the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 9 (1986) ("For plaintiffs and defendants alike, litigation
proves a miserable, disruptive, painful experience. Few litigants have a good time or bask in the
esteem of their fellows-indeed, they may be stigmatized. Even those who prevail may find the process
very costly." (footnotes omitted)); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83
GEO. L.J. 2619, 2621 (1995) ("Learned Hand once wrote, 'I must say that as a litigant I should dread
a lawsuit beyond almost anything short of sickness and death.' This is conventional wisdom. Lawsuits
are expensive, terrifying, frustrating, infuriating, humiliating, time-consuming, perhaps all-
consuming.").
2. Estimates of the precise rate of settlement vary according to methodology and types of disputes
analyzed, but virtually no one seriously doubts that, as one author has put it, "Settlement is where the
action is." Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
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The traditional law and economics model of litigation suggests that this
is readily predictable.3 This model assumes that litigants seek to maximize
their wealth through the legal system, and that they pursue this goal in a
consistent, "rational" 4 way. In what has become the classic statement of
this model, Priest and Klein predicted that litigants will compare the
financial value of a settlement offer to the expected financial value of trial
and select the course of action with the highest expected value.5 The
model predicts that trials will occur between risk-neutral parties only when
the difference between the parties' projected risk-adjusted outcome of trial
exceeds their joint costs of staging a trial.6 If at least one party is risk
System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1212 (1992); see, e.g., H. LAURENCE ROSS,
SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 179 (2d ed.
1980) (finding that less than 1% of automobile accident claims led to a trial); Patricia Munch Danzon
& Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 345, 365 (1983) (reporting that fewer than 10% of medical malpractice claims are
resolved by verdict); Donald G. Gifford & David J. Nye, Litigation Trends in Florida: Saga of a
Growth State, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 829, 855 (1987) (finding an even lower trial rate-ranging from
1.0% to 1.6%-in Florida between 1979 and 1985); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try:
Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) ("Of the hundreds
of thousands of civil lawsuits that are filed each year in America, the great majority are settled; of those
that are not settled, most are ultimately dismissed by the plaintiffs or by the courts; only a few percent
are tried to a jury or a judge."); George Lowenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 135 (1993) (estimating that 95 % of civil suits settle prior
to trial); Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on
Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833, 838-39 n.15 (1990) (extrapolating from data to determine
that only 5.3 % of federal civil suits that terminated in 1988 were maintained through trial); Trubek et
al., supra note 1, at 89 (finding that approximately 8% of civil suits filed in state and federal courts
went to trial).
3. See, e.g., John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 285-88
(1973) (modeling the economics of risky conflicts); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the
Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66-69 (1971) (exploring settlement patterns in criminal cases); Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
399, 417-29 (1973) (examining the impact of procedural rules on settlement); George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4, 12-17 (1984)
(discussing the economic implications of settlement and litigation).
4. There is no single definition of what constitutes "rational" decisionmaking, but most accounts
implicitly or explicitly presume rational individuals abide by the following principles: (1) Ordering of
Alternatives: rational individuals can compare alternatives and decide either that they prefer one to
another or are indifferent between the two; (2) Dominance: they should never prefer a decision that
yields outcomes equivalent to or worse than an alternative on every dimension; (3) Cancellation: in
choosing between two options, outcomes that will be the same under either choice should not affect the
choice; (4) Transitivity: if choice A is preferred to choice B, and choice B is preferred to choice C,
choice A is preferred to choice C; (5) Continuity: a gamble between a good outcome and bad outcome
should be preferred over a certain intermediate outcome if the likelihood of the bad outcome occurring
is sufficiently low; and (6) Invariance: the way in which two options are presented should not affect
the decisionmaker's choice between them. See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 81-82 (1993). We will assume that the term rational embodies these factors.
5. See Priest & Klein, supra note 3, at 12-13.
6. See id. at 12.
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averse, even many disputes that fit this description will settle.7 Because
trial involves high fixed costs for both litigants, it follows from the basic
law and economics model that trials will occur only when one or both par-
ties greatly overestimate the quality of his or her case.'
Given this model's assumptions, its predictions are sensible. From the
perspective of expected value analysis, trial costs avoided through settle-
ment are "gains in trade" that can be divided between the parties, leaving
both better off than they would have been had they invested resources in
formal adjudication. But the model's basic assumptions of wealth maxi-
mization and completely rational behavior ring hollow in the ears of
lawyers who have observed the behavior of litigants. The model's assump-
tions are also undermined by a growing body of empirical evidence demon-
strating that litigants often make decisions in ways that depart from these
paradigms.9 The list of reasons litigants might not behave in accordance
with the model's predictions is impressively long: Litigants litigate not just
for money, but to attain vindication; ° to establish precedent;" "to
7. Risk aversion, usually thought to characterize individuals, may also be significant in commercial
entities, which often face higher costs in the capital markets when large contingent liabilities are
looming. See RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
147 (1986).
8. Of course, the magnitude of the overestimation necessary to cause a trial to occur will vary
inversely to the stakes of the lawsuit. Thus, a smaller overestimation is necessary if a very large sum
of money is at stake relative to the cost of staging a trial.
9. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL.
L. REV. 113, 116-18 (1996) (reporting empirical studies of human decisionmaking which suggest that
current economic models do not accurately describe litigants' behavior).
10. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What
Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REV. 789, 799 (1986) (noting that libel plaintiffs sue not for economic gain
but because "litigation is the only effective means of achieving a remedy for their reputational, as
distinguished from economic, harm"); Gross & Syverud, supra note 2, at 58 ("[D]octors are insisting
on trial in some medical malpractice cases in which they expect to obtain public vindication. This is
most likely to happen when the doctor is convinced that she acted in a professionally responsible
manner, but has nonetheless been wounded in her self-esteem .... ."); Sally Engle Merry & Susan S.
Silbey, WhatDo Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 153 (1984)
(arguing that "the grievant wants vindication, protection of his or her rights (as he or she perceives
them), an advocate to help in the battle, or a third party who will uncover the 'truth' and declare the
other party wrong"); Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 63 (1985)
("[A] defendant may desire to complete the process of litigation even if victory is unlikely, because
victory in court may be the only way to obtain public vindication."); see also David A. Rammelt, Note,
"Inherent Power" and Rule 16: How Far Can a Federal Court Push the Litigant Toward Settlement?,
65 IND. L.J. 965, 1001 (1990) ("IThere are some disputes in which the litigants' primary motivation
for filing suit does not involve monetary compensation or redress, but rather involves an overwhelming
element of personal vindication." (citation omitted)). But see LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 7, at
175 (concluding from a series of studies that only plaintiffs in discrimination suits were likely to pursue
litigation for the sake of justice rather than economic well-being); Gross & Syverud, supra note 2, at
58 (finding that relatively few disputes, other than some medical malpractice disputes, went to trial
because of either party's desire for vindication).
11. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 1, at 2623 ("[A]djudication may often prove superior to
settlement for securing peace because the former, unlike the latter, creates rules and precedents.");
Simon, supra note 10, at 63 ("A corporate defendant may refuse settlements to demonstrate that futureHeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  79 1997-1998
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express their feelings";2 to obtain a hearing; 3 and to satisfy a sense of
entitlement regarding use of the courts,"4 all of which can easily preclude
out of court settlement. Moreover, their decisions to settle or litigate may
be affected by the context of the choice, 5 the frame in which it is
presented, 16 the identity of the person describing the choice, 17 whether
the litigants have faced similar choices before, 8 the litigants' self-serving
litigants should not file suit unless they are prepared to go to trial, because settlement dollars will not
be forthcoming even if the settlement demands are reasonable.").
12. Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court, 10 L.
& SOc'Y REV. 339, 346 (1976) (describing a frequent motivation of plaintiffs in small claims courts
who filed suit but did not make appearances to pursue their claims).
13. See, e.g., JANE W. ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS FARE IN THE
PITTrSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 65 (1983) (noting that litigants want "an opportunity to
have their case heard" and that they "take[ ] it for granted that they ha[ve] a right to appear in person,
to be heard fully, and to be treated even-handedly"); Gross & Syverud, supra note 2, at 57 n.87 (citing
"[s]everal scholars [who] have discussed the importance of one particular non-economic motive: the
desire to have a day in court to obtain formal justice"); Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic
Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 99 ("[T]he most frequently cited objective of lay
litigants in adjudicatory proceedings was to 'tell my side of the story .... "); Simon, supra note 10,
at 63 ("[A] plaintiff... may want to complete the process of litigation in order to feel that she has had
her day in court. Settlement may not satisfy this litigant even if the settlement would be more favorable
than the outcome at trial . . ").
14. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 179 (1990) ("The [working-class] people who go to court in
these communities do so not out of an eagerness to use the court but out of a sense of entitlement, a
sense that the courts are a resource which they, as citizens, have a right to use.").
15. See, e.g., Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 287, 297-300 (1996) (demonstrating experimentally that the choice between two settlement offers
can be affected by the presence or absence of a third choice).
16. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement:
A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 11-21 (1994)
[hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers] (demonstrating the effects of anchors and dissonance
avoidance on settlement decisionmaking); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers
to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 129-42 (1994) [hereinafter
Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers] (demonstrating the effects of frames and anchors on
settlement decisionmaking); Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 118 (demonstrating through laboratory
experiments that whether a given settlement offer is framed as a "gain" or a "loss" can affect the
desirability of the offer, and claiming that this leads to "decisions that are suboptimal, from the
perspective of a rational model").
17. See, e.g., CONSTANCE A. STILLINGER ET AL., THE "REACTIVE DEVALUATION" BARRIER TO
CONFLiCr RESOLUTION (Stanford Ctr. on Conflict and Negotiation Working Paper No. 3, 1988)
(identifying "the tendency for disputants to devalue each other's concessions as a direct consequence
of the fact that it's their adversary who has offered them" (emphasis in original)); Lee Ross &
Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 389, 400 (1991) (noting that
a mediator "may help to redefine or reframe the adversaries' perceptions of a proposed settlement...
in a way that facilitates concession-making"); see also Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers,
supra note 16, at 150-60 (suggesting that reactive devaluation might be a version of spiteful behavior,
rather than a separate phenomenon).
18. See, e.g., Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers, supra note 16, at 20-21 (suggesting that the
psychological need to avoid dissonance might lead litigants to disfavor settlement offers solely because
they disfavored them in the past, even when circumstances have changed).
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biases concerning the fairness of their position, 9 habit, unyielding
conceptions of justice," and myriad other factors.
21
All of this raises a puzzling question: How does the economic model
accurately predict the high rate of settlement if disputant behavior systemat-
ically departs from the assumptions of the model in ways that suggest
lower rates of settlement? One likely answer, we submit, is the role of
lawyers in the litigation system. Although most accounts of lawsuit
settlement-including our own prior work'-share the simplifying
assumption that litigation is a two-party activity carried out by a plaintiff
and a defendant,' the feature of litigation bargaining that most differenti-
ates it from other types of negotiation is the presence of lawyers.24 In
this article, we provide experimental evidence supportive of the hypothesis
that lawyers as a class share an analytical orientation to decisionmaking that
can facilitate a higher rate of settlement than behavioral scientists would
expect litigants to negotiate on their own.'
19. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON.
REV. 1337, 1337 (1995) (proposing that failure to settle can reflect the parties' overconfident
predictions of trial outcomes based on their self-serving conceptions of what adjudicated result would
be fair).
20. See, e.g., Merry & Silbey, supra note 10, at 158 ("Our data suggest that much dispute
behavior continues to be governed by affect, habit, and conceptions of right, appropriateness, or
fittingness that are not subject to rational evaluation but are part of the taken-for-granted quality of daily
life in particular communities.").
21. See generally BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995)
[hereinafter BARRIERS] (describing institutional, strategic, and psychological barriers to conflict
resolution).
22. See Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers, supra note 16; Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological
Barriers, supra note 16.
23. A notable exception to this pattern is the literature on the impact that fee arrangements may
have on attorney and client incentives in litigation. See infra notes 147-51.
24. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 510 (1994) (deeming the attorney's
role as agent in the dispute-resolution process to be the central institutional characteristic of the legal
system).
25. In a recent article, Gilson and Mnookin used a game-theoretic perspective to argue that
lawyers, as repeat players in litigation, might be able to establish reputations for cooperative behavior
and thus solve collective-action problems faced by litigants who would otherwise be encouraged to
litigate acrimoniously. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 24, at 512-13, 522-27. Although Gilson
and Mnookin analyzed behavior during the discovery phase of litigation, see id. at 514, their theory
suggests that lawyers with a reputation for cooperativeness might enable litigants to reach more (and
faster) settlements when continuing litigation would be a wasteful course of action. See id. at 564.
Gilson and Mnookin's theory, which assumes rational behavior on the part of actors in the litigation
system, see id. at 515, provides an explanation of how lawyers can promote settlement that fits well
within the boundaries of economic theory. Cf. Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and Contractarian
Paradigms in the Uneasy Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 149, 149-50 (1996) (employing a similar game-theoretic approach to argue that lawyers
representing regulated firms and government regulators can cooperate and thereby improve the
efficiency of the regulatory process). Our account, while different from Gilson and Mnookin's, is com-
plementary to it. The combination of our stories might provide an even stronger explanation of the
high rate of settlement than either one alone.
1997]
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Our argument has three major components: First, relying on the
results of a series of controlled experiments, we conclude that lawyers and
litigants, on average, are likely to evaluate litigation options differently.
Specifically, we contend that lawyers are more likely than litigants to apply
an expected financial value analysis to the settlement-versus-trial decision,
whereas certain cognitive and social-psychological phenomena that can dis-
tract from expected value analysis are more likely to influence litigants.
In any given situation, this disparity could cause lawyers to be more or less
inclined toward settlement than litigants. Given the high costs of trial,
however, we submit that an analysis more exclusively focused on financial
considerations is likely to yield support for settlement more often than
alternative decisionmaking approaches.'
Second, although litigants, not lawyers, must ultimately decide
whether to accept a settlement offer or to demand adjudication,27 our
experiments provide some illustrative support for the belief that lawyers
have the ability-at least under some circumstances-to persuade litigants
to approach the settlement-versus-trial decision from the lawyer's preferred
analytical perspective." This leads to the conclusion that lawyers can
facilitate settlement in cases when litigants would probably not reach agree-
ment on their own.29 Given the lack of other convincing explanations for
the high rate of settlement, we believe that lawyers probably do what they
can do-namely, promote more settlement than would otherwise occur.
Third, we believe that lawyers can promote efficiency in dispute
resolution, but that they do not do so necessarily or automatically. When
disputants wish to maximize wealth through litigation but are not sure how
to do so, the lawyer employing expected financial value analysis can
promote efficiency. But disputants do not necessarily attempt to maximize
dollar wealth through the litigation process. When a client favors other
goals, the lawyer who fails to understand the client's values can promote
settlements that give the client an optimal financial return but are nonethe-
less inefficient because they fail to maximize the client's expected utility.
26. See infra Part I for a description of our research methodology, and infra Part II for our
experimental results.
27. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) provide that "[a] lawyer shall abide
by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1995). The Model Rules were adopted by the American Bar
Association (ABA) in 1983 "to serve as a national framework for implementation of standards of
professional conduct." Robert W. Meserve, Chairperson's Introduction to MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2 (1995). The ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which
preceded the Model Rules, made the same point, albeit less directly: "In certain areas of legal
representation not affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client,
a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is
exclusively that of the client ... ." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980).
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part IV.
[VIol. 76:77
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To promote efficient dispute resolution as well as to best serve the interests
of their clients, we suggest lawyers follow what we term the "cognitive
error approach" to client counseling. This approach requires that, when
the lawyer and client evaluate litigation options differently, the lawyer
analyze the basis for the difference and attempt to persuade the client to
reorient his analysis only in certain prescribed circumstances.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the research method-
ology employed in our experiments to measure whether lawyers and liti-
gants evaluate litigation decisions in systematically different ways. Part II
describes the results of the experiments, which suggest such a systematic
difference. Part III describes and reviews a second series of experiments
designed to test the extent to which litigants are likely to revisit their initial
evaluations of litigation options after a lawyer attempts to influence them
to do so. Part IV considers whether the observed differences between
lawyers and clients promote or impede the efficient resolution of disputes
and then describes the cognitive error approach to client counseling, which
is designed to promote efficient settlement. Part V concludes with a brief
exploration of how, in light of our experimental evidence, lawyers' obliga-
tions to the greater public interest might affect their role as advisors and
counselors to individual litigants.
I. The Research Design
A. Introduction
The literature on litigation bargaining-dominated by law and
economics analysis-assumes disputants decide whether to settle a legal dis-
pute or to demand adjudication solely on the basis of which option is likely
to yield the greatest financial30 reward."' In fact, however, litigants'
30. Although economic analysis, generally, is based on the assumption that individuals maximize
utility, not wealth, much of law and economics analysis assumes the wealth-maximization norm for
either practical (i.e., wealth is more readily measured than utility) or ideological reasons (i.e., wealth
maximization is normatively superior to utility). See, e.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 19 (1994) (generalizing that much of the law and
economics literature employs the wealth-maximization assumption, which conceivably presents fewer
problems in empirical testing); Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV.
815, 835 (1990) ("Those who espouse Chicago-style law & economics have traded away a broad
concept of 'well-being' based in the social sciences for a narrow concept-wealth maximization-based
on market preferences."); Richard A. Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency
Theory of the Common Law, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775 (1981) (explaining that wealth maximization
underlies both the positive and normative versions of the "efficiency theory" of law); Richard A.
Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 243
(1980) (noting that "economic analysts of law have argued that efficiency in this sense [i.e., wealth
maximization] provides a good explanation of many common law rules and principles"); Richard A.
Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 103 (1979) (arguing that
"'wealth maximization' provides a firmer basis for a normative theory of law than does utilitarianism").
31. This account of settlement is advanced in RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
554-56 (4th ed. 1992); Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1069-70; Gould, supra note 3, at 296-97;
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  83 1997-1998
Texas Law Review [Vol. 76:77
decisionmaking processes depart systematically from the law and economics
account.32
In two previous articles,33 we demonstrated experimentally that some
litigants are likely to decline settlement offers that appear to serve their
financial interests because they rely on decisionmaking heuristics-mental
strategies that allow people to more simply solve problems 34-to make
decisions.35 We showed, for instance, that experimental subjects playing
the role of litigants will often respond differently to the choice between a
specific settlement offer and a risky trial if the two options appear to
represent gains as opposed to losses from some reference point.36
Similarly, we demonstrated that our subjects would make the settlement-
versus-trial decision differently depending on whether they felt the
opposing litigant had treated them equitably or inequitably.37
For these reasons alone (not to mention the plethora of barriers to
settlement suggested by others),38 it is difficult to explain why more than
ninety percent of lawsuits settle short of trial.39 One possible explanation
Landes, supra note 3, at 61; Posner, supra note 3, at 417-20; and Priest & Klein, supra note 3, at 4-5.
For empirical tests of this hypothesis, see Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining
Behavior Within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
161 (1988); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting To No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319 (1991); Loewenstein et al., supra note 2;
and Linda R. Stanley & Don L. Coursey, Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the
Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 145 (1990).
The same principles that are generally used to evaluate civil litigation can be applied to criminal
litigation, with plea bargains constituting settlements. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea
Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 L. & Soc'Y REV. 247, 255 (1979) (reporting that most
criminal cases since the turn of the century have been resolved through pleas and plea bargaining rather
than adjudication); Landes, supra note 3, at 61 (providing an economic analysis of what determines
whether criminal cases settle with a plea bargain or go to trial).
32. See generally Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISp. RESOL. 235, 235 (1993) (noting that many resolutions
fail to achieve Pareto efficiency); Ross & Stillinger, supra note 17, at 389-90 (discussing the barriers
to resolving conflicts through negotiation).
33. See Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers, supra note 16, at 16-21 (testing the anchoring-and-
adjustment phenomenon and dissonance-reducing behavior); Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological
Barriers, supra note 16, at 117 (testing framing effects, personal animus and equity seeking, and
reactive devaluation of adversarial offers).
34. See MASSIMO PIATITELLI-PALMARINI, INEVITABLE ILLUSIONS: How MISTAKES OF REASON
RULE OUR MINDS 19-20 (1994) (explaining that heuristics are simple and approximate rules used in
analyzing certain situations, such as the assumption that objects appearing dense and compact are
heavy).
35. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction to BARRIERS, supra note 21, at 3, 10-19
(identifying cognitive and motivational processes, including those that we tested, that cause the rejection
of agreements which "seemingly meet the requirements of rational self-interest"). Whether actions
resulting from these psychological processes actually are in conflict with the actors' rational self-interest
is discussed infra Part IV.
36. See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 16, at 130-38, 139-42.
37. See id. at 144-47.
38. See, e.g., BARRIERS, supra note 21.
39. See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text.
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is the role that lawyers play in the litigation settlement process. But this
is a plausible explanation only if two conditions are met. First, lawyers
must be less affected by cognitive and social-psychological factors than
their clients. Second, lawyers must be able to influence their clients'
settlement decisionmaking behavior.'
As to the former, the experimental psychology literature is not
encouraging; by and large, the literature suggests that experts in a given
field (such as lawyers) are as likely as nonexperts to rely on heuristics that
cause them to deviate from expected value analysis." In one experiment,
for example, Neale and Northcraft asked a group of professional negotia-
tors and a group of students to negotiate the price of a refrigerator. They
found that a cognitive heuristic known as "framing" affected both
groups.42 Similarly, McNeil, Pauker, Sox, and Tversky found that both
physicians and nonphysicians were systematically influenced by the framing
of prospective treatment outcomes when asked to recommend treatment for
lung cancer. 3 The researchers found, for instance, that both sets of
subjects were more likely to select radiation treatment over surgery when
the possible outcomes of surgery were explained in terms of death rates
rather than survival rates.'
40. See Lowenstein et al., supra note 2, at 157 (noting that lawyer behavior is relevant to
settlement decisionmaking only if lawyers learn from experience to moderate their behavior and can
convince principals to modify theirs as well, and speculating that it is "questionable" whether either
condition is met).
41. See MARGARET A. NEALE & MAX H. BAZERMAN, COGNITION AND RATIONALITY IN
NEGOTIATION 81-96 (1991) (summarizing experimental data on the impact of experience in negotiation
success); PIATrELLI-PALMARINI, supra note 34, at 66-67 (summarizing experiments demonstrating that
"doctors, generals, politicians, and engineers" are as likely as others to believe that two often-related
conditions are more likely to appear together than either separately, even when making judgments in
their area of expertise); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343 (1984) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Choices] (describing the cognitive
phenomenon of framing and concluding that the failure of invariance which framing represents "is both
pervasive and robust. It is as common among sophisticated respondents as among naive ones ..... );
see also William J. Qualls & Christopher P. Puto, Organizational Climate and Decision Framing: An
Integrated Approach to Analyzing Industrial Buying Decisions, 26 J. MARKETING RES. 179 (1989)
(studying the purchasing decisions of managers); Michael J. Roszkowski & Glenn E. Snelbecker,
Effects of "Framing" on Measures of Risk Tolerance: Financial Planners are Not Immune, 19 J.
BEHAV. ECON. 237 (1990) (studying the effect of framing on financial planners); Joel E. Urbany &
Peter R. Dickson, Prospect Theory and Pricing Decisions, 19 J. BEHAV. ECON. 69 (1990) (studying
the pricing decisions of retailers).
42. See Margaret A. Neale & Gregory B. Northcraft, Experts, Amateurs, and Refrigerators:
Comparing Expert and Amateur Negotiators in a Novel Task, 38 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 305 (1986). For a discussion of framing, see infra subpart II(A).
43. See Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1262 (1982).
44. See id.; see also Rachael F. Heller et al., Heuristics in Medical and Non-medical Decision-
making, 44A Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 211, 226 (1992) (observing that the occurrence of
heuristic-based biases in pediatric residents can increase with the level of training).
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Psychologists contend that experts are often as susceptible as non-
experts to so-called psychological "biases" a' because decisionmaking
experience alone is not a reliable means of learning decisionmaking
skills.' These psychologists explain that experience is only as useful as
the feedback that accompanies it, 7 and often useful feedback is unavail-
able to even experienced decisionmakers in a given field. Lawyers who
recommend settlement, for example, seldom have information after the fact
about the consequences that would have ensued had different decisions been
made." If there are no objective methods to evaluate the quality of deci-
sions retrospectively, it is doubtful that the mere repetition of a decision-
making exercise will improve ability.49
45. The negative connotation of the term "bias" reflects the dominant view in psychology that
decisionmaking behavior is deviant when it departs from the normative standard of expected utility
theory. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of
Bounded Rationality, 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 650, 650 (1996) (stressing that although psychological
models of decisionmaking behavior have replaced the "classical rationality of the Enlightenment" with
the "heuristics and biases program," they have retained the "laws of probability and statistics as
normative" criteria). In section V(C)(2), infra, we question whether using heuristics in a way that
violates the predictions of expected value theory always constitutes a reasoning error.
46. See, e.g., FRANK J. LANDY & JAMES L. FARR, THE MEASUREMENT OF WORK PERFORMANCE
238 (1983) (suggesting that even experienced decisionmakers must exert considerable effort to avoid
using heuristic-based biases); Robyn M. Dawes, Experience and Validity of Clinical Judgment: The
Illusory Correlation, 7 BEHAV. SCl. & L. 457, 465 (1989) (discussing the tenuous correlation between
the experience of clinical psychologists and the validity of their judgments); Howard N. Garb, Clinical
Judgment, Clinical Training, and Professional Experience, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 387, 387-91 (1989)
(reviewing studies of the effects of training and experience on clinical psychological-assessment
accuracy); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J.
BUS. S251, S274-75 (1986) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice] (arguing that
decisionmaking experience without the proper feedback results in ineffective learning).
47. See Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology and Economics Conference Handbook: Comments on
Simon, on Einhorn and Hogarth, and on Tversky and Kahneman, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE
CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 95, 96 (1987) ("Accurate learning takes place only
when the individual receives timely and organized feedback.").
48. See Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 46, at S274-75 (listing the lack of
information about alternative outcomes as a typical failure of feedback that prevents learning from
experience). In addition to the lack of information about alternative choices, Tversky and Kahneman
noted that useful feedback is rarely available because (1) outcomes are delayed and difficult to attribute
to a particular action, (2) variability in the environment reduces the reliability of feedback, and (3)
important decisions are often unique, such that their results rarely are of use in making subsequent
decisions. See id.; see also Dawes, supra note 46, at 465-66 (discussing clinical psychologists' need
to know the hypothetical outcomes of decisions not taken in order to determine the validity of their
decisions). For speculation that lawyers, like other experts, lack the feedback necessary to use
experience to their advantage in decisionmaking, see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen,
Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
(forthcoming Oct. 1997) (manuscript at 63-64 & n.97, on file with the Texas Law Review).
49. See Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An
Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 95-96 (1987) [hereinafter Northcraft & Neale, Property Pricing].
Northcraft and Neale found that real estate agents fell prey to the same cognitive biases that amateurs
did when estimating real estate prices, and they suggested that when there is no clear objective standard
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Despite these pessimistic findings, there are reasons to suspect that
lawyers might be less susceptible than other experts to psychological
biases. Lawyers are known for their analytical skills.' To gain
admission to law school, an applicant must demonstrate a higher-than-
average ability to think analytically.5 Once in law school, legal training
reinforces analytical problem-solving. By persistently emphasizing the
careful reading of appellate cases, legal training teaches lawyers to analyze
legal conflicts carefully and unemotionally rather than to react to them
viscerally.' Once on the job, this analytical training serves as a lens
through which lawyers view and evaluate their experiences. Perhaps, then,
on which to evaluate a decision, feedback may simply refine the description of the judgment process
rather than the quality of the judgment. See id.
50. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer ed., Anchor
Books 1969) (1835) ("Men who have made a special study of the laws . . . have derived therefrom
habits of order, something of a taste for formalities, and an instinctive love for a regular concatenation
of ideas .... "); DAVID RIESMAN, INDIVIDUALISM RECONSIDERED 463 (1954) ("[Ihe [legal]
profession operates... to drain off some of the culture's more adept and avid reasoners, who might
find themselves deviants if these careers were not open to them as external defenses and internal
sublimations .... [The lawyer] stands at once for reason and for an excess of it."); GERALD L.
WILSON & HARRY H. HARKINS, JR., PRE-LAW HANDBOOK FOR DUKE STUDENTS, quoted in RICHARD
W. MOLL, THE LURE OF THE LAW 27 (1990) ("Lawyers tend to see themselves as technicians more
than anything else. . . . The uninitiated may be distressed to find that the personal side of a case, the
emotions of the people involved, may be of little concern to the attorney. .. ").
51. According to the Law School Admission Council, the two most important factors for admission
to law school are generally "prior academic performance and the Law School Admission Test score."
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, INC., THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 7 (1996). The
Law School Admission Test "is designed to measure skills that are considered essential for success in
law school: the reading and comprehension of complex texts with accuracy and insight; the organization
and management of information and the ability to draw reasonable inferences from it; the ability to
reason critically; and the analysis and evaluation of the reasoning and argument of others." Id.; see also
Barry D. Boyer & Roger C. Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and
Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 248 (1974) (reporting that law students whose decisions are based
on analysis and logic outnumberlaw students whose decisions are motivated by appreciation, sympathy,
and concern for the rights of others).
52. See, e.g., C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS at vi (1871)
("Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery of
these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human
affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer.... ."); LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, supra note 51,
at 3 ("The case method involves the detailed examination of a number of related judicial opinions that
describe an area of law .... [The professor will] ask questions designed to explore the facts presented,
to determine the legal principles applied in reaching a decision, and to analyze the method of reasoning
used."); JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW
SCHOOLS 24 (1914) ("T]he real purpose of scientific instruction in law is not to impart the content of
the law, not to teach the law, but rather to arouse, to strengthen, to carry to the highest possible pitch
of perfection a specifically legal manner of thinking."); Melissa L. Nelkin, Negotiation and
Psychoanalysis: If I'd Wanted to Learn About Feelings, I Wouldn't Have Gone to Law School, 46 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 420, 422 (1996) ("In law school, students are taught that how they feel about the cases
they read is irrelevant; what matters is the soundness of their logic. Unlike medicine, for example, law
is still taught largely as an exercise in abstraction, based on case reports and analysis of judicial
opinions.").
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lawyers approach decisions from a different perspective than most other
people or are better able to learn from their experiences than other
professionals, or both. 3
B. Methodology
To gain insight into whether lawyers and their clients are likely to
evaluate litigation settlement options differently, we constructed a series of
written, hypothetical litigation scenarios that we presented to two pools of
subjects: potential litigants and practicing attorneys.
Our potential litigant pool consisted of 445 Stanford University
undergraduate students recruited at dormitories across campus. We
instructed these subjects to place themselves in the role of the plaintiff in
one or more litigation scenarios. 4 Our second pool of subjects consisted
of ninety practicing attorneys from the San Francisco and Palo Alto offices
of San Francisco-based law firms.55 We instructed the attorneys to place
themselves in the role of the attorney for the plaintiff in the litigation
scenarios. We made no attempt to control the number of subjects in either
pool on the basis of race, gender, year in college, major, year in practice,
or substantive specialty. Because the hypothetical scenarios tested decision-
making in litigation, we did consider whether attorney subjects identified
themselves as "primarily litigators, ""primarily transactional attorneys, "or
"primarily other" (with an explanation), but there were no significant
differences in responses between these subgroups of attorneys.
We told the litigant subjects that the experiments were part of a study
of how people involved in lawsuits respond to settlement offers. Those
who participated received a "Mrs. Field's" cookie. The attorney subjects
were advised in a memorandum signed by a senior litigation partner that
their firm had agreed to participate in an academic study of how lawyers
respond to settlement offers and that their individual participation was
requested (but, due to the anonymous nature of the study, obviously not
required). Participating lawyers received no compensation. Slightly fewer
than one-third of the lawyers asked to participate did so. We estimate that
the litigant response rate was roughly the same, although we have no way
of measuring precisely what percentage of the students who were aware of
53. But see Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs about Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of
Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 289, 296-97 (1995) (finding that lawyer
subjects were as affected by framing biases in a negotiating experiment as were student subjects).
54. The complete results of this study are described in detail in Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological
Barriers, supra note 16. Here, we discuss only those results that we compare directly to the results
obtained from the practicing attorneys we surveyed for this study.
55. In return for their cooperation in the study, lawyer subjects were promised complete
confidentiality, as were their law firms. The complete survey results, including the participants' names,
law firms, and demographic information, are on file with the authors.
[Vol. 76:77
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our request for subjects participated. Although the subjects were self-
selected and therefore potentially subject to sampling biases,56 there is no
obvious reason to think that the students who agreed to participate in the
study differed on average from the larger pool of Stanford undergraduates
or that the lawyei who Pitt UU11AdLU U111ULCU ViidVrd 11U)111 UUI t d1 Wyc1b
in their firms-at least in any way that would be likely to affect responses
to the questions asked.57
Litigant and lawyer subjects each received a one-page instruction sheet
attached to a multi-page survey. The only substantive difference in the
instructions was that litigants were told they would "play the role of a
participant" in hypothetical lawsuit scenarios and be asked to answer ques-
tions about whether they would accept proposed settlement offers, while
lawyers were told they would "play the role of the lawyer" in hypothetical
lawsuits and be asked to answer questions about whether they would
"advise their client" to accept proposed settlement offers. The instructions
asked the participants to read all information given to them "slowly and
carefully" and not to discuss the survey with anyone else before completing
it. Litigant subjects completed the surveys in the presence of the experi-
menters and returned them immediately upon completion. Lawyer subjects
completed the surveys at their convenience and returned them by mail.
For each hypothetical lawsuit scenario, we randomly assigned approxi-
mately half of the litigants and half of the lawyers to either "Group A" or
"Group B." ' Regardless of the group to which they were assigned, sub-
jects received hypothetical litigation scenarios that were identical in all
56. See DAVID W. MARTIN, DOING PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENTS 196 (4th ed. 1996) ("Selection
can be a threat [to internal validity] whenever participants are assigned nonrandomly, particularly when
they are self-selected." (emphasis in original)); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Neil Vidmar, Empirical
Research on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at
13, 19-20 (noting that voluntary participation for remuneration by members of a pool in a similarly
designed set of experiments could "conceivably have introduced some self-selection bias of uncertain
direction in the samples"). See generally Robert Rosenthal, The Volunteer Subject, in THE SCIENCE
OF PSYCHOLOGY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 162, 177-79 (Duane P. Schultz ed., 1970) (comparing
volunteer and nonvolunteer subjects and concluding that volunteers pose a greater risk of
nonrepresentativeness and inferential errors in experimental outcomes).
57. Of course, Stanford undergraduates might differ in important ways from the average potential
litigant, and lawyers practicing in the law firms sampled might differ in relevant ways from the general
population of lawyers. This problem of "external validity" is discussed infra text accompanying notes
67-71.
58. Each subject was randomly assigned to Group A or Group B independently for each scenario
that he or she received. Thus, whether subjects were assigned to Group A or Group B in one scenario
did not affect whether they were assigned to Group A or Group B in another scenario.
All the lawyer subjects participated in all three of the experimental scenarios discussed in this
section. The psychological phenomena tested in each scenario were different, as were the fact patterns,
so we have no reason to believe that exposure to one scenario would bias responses to others. All
litigant subjects also participated in three different experimental scenarios, but not necessarily all three
of the scenarios discussed in this Article.
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respects but one. That is, both Group A and Group B subjects received the
same facts regarding the incidents at issue, the same information regarding
possible trial outcomes, and the same final settlement offer from the
defendant. The only difference between scenarios given to subjects
assigned to Groups A and B was the independent variable-one of a variety
of psychological constructs that we wished to study.59
After reading the hypothetical fact patterns and learning of a settlement
offer proposed by the defendant, subjects were asked to indicate how likely
they were to accept the offer (or advise their client to accept the offer) by







We drew conclusions regarding the effect of the independent variable
on the litigant subjects by comparing the responses of Group A and B
litigants, and we drew conclusions regarding the effect of the same inde-
pendent variable on the lawyer subjects by comparing the responses of
Group A and B lawyers.' We used an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
test to measure the interaction between the subject pools and independent
variablesrl-that is, to compare the difference between the responses of
litigants randomly assigned to Groups A and B to the difference between
the responses of lawyers assigned to Groups A and B.
59. For example, in "The Broken Heater" scenario, described in detail below, all subjects received
a written description of a situation in which a landlord failed to heat a tenant's apartment, and the
tenant subsequently brought suit. The only difference between the scenarios presented to Group A and
Group B subjects was the explanation for the landlord's behavior: members of the latter group learned
that the landlord had a sympathetic, if not legally valid, explanation for his failure to provide heat to
the tenant's apartment; the former group of subjects did not. See infra note 113 and accompanying
text.
60. Our standard initial comparison between groups within the same subject pools was a t-statistic
test comparing the mean responses given by each group. As is the social science convention, we label
the difference between two means as "statistically significant" if p < .05, meaning that the probability
that observed differences are due to chance is less than 5%. In reality, though, the difference between
a statistical test with a p-value of slightly less than .05 and one with a p-value of slightly greater than
.05 is one of degree, not of kind, so we report differences between groups that fail to reach the .05
level of confidence but are still extremely likely to be due to differences between survey groups rather
than chance as "approaching significance."
61. A multi-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) test with a test for interaction effects is used to
determine whether the effect of one variable on outcomes (here, the psychological phenonienon
manipulated) depends on the level of another variable (here, the subject pool tested). See IRWIN P.
LEVIN & JAMES V. HINDRICHS, EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONTEMPORARY METHODS AND
APPLICATIONS 64 (1995).
[Vol. 76:77
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Three methodological points regarding the design of the scenarios bear
mentioning. First, when presented with a settlement offer by the
defendant, all litigant and lawyer subjects were informed that the offers
were final, that there would be no time before trial for further negotiations
or counteroffers,62 and that they were required to choose between accep-
ting the offer and proceeding to trial (or advising their client to select
between those two choices). With this contrivance, we sought to prevent
subjects from rejecting an offer simply because they believed that by
holding out for a better offer they might force the adversary to make
additional concessions.63 In other words, the experimental design sought
to measure the subjects' true preference between the specific settlement and
trial options presented and to discourage strategic behavior that might
obscure this preference.
Second, all subjects responding to a given scenario possessed identical
legal entitlements, regardless of the group to which they were randomly
assigned. Although subjects placed in Group A for a given experiment
received a scenario with a slightly different fact pattern than those in Group
B, the difference did not affect either their likelihood of prevailing at trial
or the amount of damages they were likely to recover in a successful trial.
The equivalence of legal rights across experimental groups is obviously
critical; without it, observable differences between the settlement behavior
of Group A and B subjects might be due solely to differences in legal
entitlements.' It would be uninteresting, to say the least, to demonstrate
62. Negotiation scholars have hypothesized that the imposition of a deadline can mitigate against
psychological barriers to conflict resolution. Because the deadline provides the offeree with a causal
explanation for why the offeror extends the offer, the offeree is likely to be less skeptical of the
offeror's motives and more likely to be receptive to an offer. See, e.g., Ross & Stillinger, supra note
17, at 398-400 (arguing that deadlines may encourage settlement by satisfying the offeree's need to
identify "causal attributions" for the offeror's behavior and by allowing the parties to anticipate the
dissonance they will feel if the deadline expires without settlement). Critics of our research design
might challenge the validity of our results on the ground that we imposed a deadline on our subjects.
We believe this criticism is misplaced. First, it is not clear that deadlines actually do promote settle-
ment. More importantly, if deadlines do promote settlement, this would make all our subjects slightly
more likely to accept settlement offers than they would be absent the deadline. Because our results are
based on between-subject comparisons, the impact of the deadline, assuming it exists, probably would
affect all our subjects equally and thus would not affect the comparative results.
63. See generally Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model
of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) (formally demonstrating that trials may result
even when both parties would prefer settlement because one or both parties strategically holds out for
the lion's share of the gains of trade to be made from settling); Mnookin & Ross, supra note 35, at 3,
9-10 (pointing out that even when there is a bargaining surplus and both parties know the other's
reservation price, there will still be no deal if the parties cannot reach agreement on how to divide the
surplus).
64. In negotiation theory, a subject's "BATNA" is its "best alternative to a negotiated agreement."
In our experiments, a subject's BATNA is a trial. The quality of a subject's BATNA, and thus how
favorably it compares to a given settlement offer, will, of course, depend on his trial prospects. A
subject with a strong BATNA has relatively more power in settlement than one with a weak BATNA.
1997]
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that litigants and attorneys with weak cases are more likely to accept a
given settlement offer than those with strong cases!
Finally, we told all litigants that their attorneys were representing
them free of charge, and we told all lawyers that they were representing
their clients on a pro bono basis. As all our observations are based on the
extent to which Group A and B subjects differ from each other, rather than
on the absolute responses provided by any group, the "no legal fees"
instruction was not strictly necessary to the successful measurement of the
effect caused by the independent variables tested.6' Nevertheless, we used
this contrivance in the belief that if subjects did not have to consider the
tangential issue of attorneys' fees, they would be able to devote more
attention to analyzing and responding to the substance of the defendant's
settlement offer.'
C. External Validity
Our results shed light on the decisionmaking processes of experimental
subjects operating in the controlled environment we constructed. We
believe the results also raise strong inferences about the decisionmaking
processes of litigants and lawyers engaged in real-world dispute resolution.
Because it is often difficult to generalize from experimental results,
however, our experiments do not necessarily demonstrate how litigants and
lawyers assess actual legal disputes.67 It is possible that our results are
not generalizable-i. e., that they lack "external validity"-because of either
the composition of our subject pools or certain experimental conditions we
created.
1. Subjects.-Our sample of litigant and lawyer subjects is not
necessarily representative of the general population of litigants and lawyers.
While the student litigant subjects are all potential litigants, they do not
constitute a random sample of that population. Stanford undergraduates as
a group differ from the nationwide class of litigants in terms of age, life
experience, education level, and socio-economic status. Thus, they might
See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING
IN 102-03 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991) (arguing that a party's superior strength or wealth does not
translate into negotiating power unless that party uses its strength to determine the attractiveness of its
BATNA).
65. For a discussion of external validity concerns, see infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
66. See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 16, at 124-25 (eliminating all
consideration of legal fees from that study because "the high cost of pursuing a claim to trial can
provide a strong incentive for out-of-court settlement").
67. See, e.g., Dan Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of Disputes,
15 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 655, 667 (1980-1981) ("It is often difficult to generalize from results obtained
under such [experimental] conditions to more realistic irjurious experiences and disputes.").
[Vol. 76:77
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analyze legal disputes in a systematically different way, on average, than
members of the larger potential litigant population.6"
Similarly, our lawyer subjects do not constitute a random sample of
the population of lawyers. All of our lawyer subjects practice at relatively
large law firms69 in the San Francisco Bay Area. Moreover, they practice
primarily, if not exclusively, civil law. They tend to represent institutional
clients, and the litigators among them are primarily defense lawyers. Their
thought processes, on average, might not mirror those of the average law-
yer engaged in litigation settlement negotiations.
Despite these factors, there are reasons to believe our subjects might
be representative of actual litigants and lawyers. Research has
demonstrated, at least in cognitive psychology experiments similar in
design to our own, that responses of college students often do not vary
systematically from those of others.7' Thus, our population of under-
graduate students may represent the population of potential litigants fairly
well. Our lawyer subjects, while not perfectly representative of lawyers
generally, are representative of the general population of lawyers in ways
that we hypothesize are most likely to cause lawyers to analyze litigation
settlement offers differently than nonlawyers-they have chosen to join the
legal profession, they have been trained in the legal academy, and their
daily work involves advocating on behalf of others.
68. For thoughtful critiques of the use of undergraduate students in psychology research, see David
0. Sears, College Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influences of a Narrow Data Base on Psychology's
View of Human Nature, 51 J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 515 (1986) and Reginald Smart, Subject
Selection Bias in Psychological Research, in THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
155-61 (Duane P. Schultz ed., 1970).
69. One-third of all attorneys in private practice in 1991 worked in firms employing more than
50 lawyers. See BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT:
THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990s, at 8 (1994). Moreover, the number of lawyers working
for larger firms rose significantly from 1980 to 1991. See id. In 1980, 7% of private practitioners
worked for firms employing 51 to 100 attorneys, and another 7% worked in firms employing more than
100 attorneys. See id. By 1991, 10% of private practitioners worked in firms employing 51 to 100
lawyers, and 23% worked in firms employing more than 100 lawyers. See id.; see also MARC
GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW
FIRM 46 (1991) (tracing the growth in large law firms from the 1950s to the 1990s); ROBERT
GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS 5 (1992) (reporting that half of UCLA Law School graduates
in 1986 entered law firms employing more than 50 lawyers and that 14% of law school graduates
entering private practice in 1987 did so with firms of 100 or more attorneys).
70. See, e.g., Neale & Northcraft, supra note 42, at 309, 316 (concluding that students and
professional negotiators responded similarly during experiments on the effects of framing); Northcraft
& Neale, Property Pricing, supra note 49, at 85-95 (finding that both experts and amateurs "were
significantly biased" by "an arbitrarily chosen reference point" and concluding that "(1) experts are
susceptible to decision bias, even in the confines of their 'home' decision setting, and (2) experts are
less likely than amateurs to admit to (or perhaps understand) their use of heuristics in producing biased
judgments"); James F. Smith & Thomas Kida, Heuristics and Biases: Expertise and Task Realism in
Auditing, 109 PSYCHOL. BULL. 472, 483 (1991) (finding that cognitive biases and heuristics affect both
expert auditors and students, though the effects on auditors "performing familiar, job-related tasks" are
less pronounced).
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Even if our subjects differ systematically from the broad classes of
potential litigants and attorneys in how they analyze litigation decision
options, our subjects are almost certainly representative of a significant
subsection of litigants and lawyers. At worst then, we believe our results
provide a valuable snapshot of part of the litigation bargaining world.
2. Experimental conditions.-Our second external validity concern is
that subjects asked to "play a role" in our survey might not analyze options
in the same way that they would in an actual dispute. This could be the
case for any of a number of reasons: subjects are not likely to be as
committed to participating in an experiment as they are when their personal
interests are at stake;7' the hypothetical scenarios are necessarily less
factually and legally complex than most real world disputes; and the
experiments do not replicate the time element existent in actual settlement
negotiations, but rather require subjects to digest the facts of a case,
consider a settlement offer, and respond in a compressed time frame.
Again, though, we believe these potential drawbacks are far from
fatal. Because of our between-subject experimental design, differences
between experimental and real-world conditions are troubling only if they
have a differential effect on Group A and Group B subjects. Although
more commitment, more complexity, and more time could cause subjects
to react to decision options differently, there is no reason to believe that
any group of subjects selected at random from the litigant pool (or the
lawyer pool) would be more affected by these factors than any other group
randomly selected from the same pool. It is conceivable that the experi-
mental setting could have skewed the responses of litigants more than
lawyers (or vice versa), which, if true, would be troubling, but it is not
obvious to us why this would be the case.
71. A number of studies suggests that subjects are just as susceptible to psychological
decisionmaking biases when they have more at stake. See, e.g., David M. Grether & Charles R. Plott,
Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 623, 623
(1979) (noting that although subjects prefer those lotteries that promise a greater chance of winning,
they will place a higher value on a riskier lottery that has a larger reward); Steven J. Kachelmeier &
Mohamed Shehata, Examining Risk Preferences Under High Monetary Incentives: Experimental
Evidence from the People's Republic of China, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1120, 1137 (1992) (finding a
pattern of strong "risk-seeking preferences for low-probability gain prospects" in their subjects).
Professor Thaler has discussed this phenomenon:
1. If the stakes are large enough, people will get it right. This comment is usually offered
to rebut a demonstration of embarrassing inconsistency on the part of a group of
undergraduate students participating in an experiment at one of our leading universities.
Many such demonstrations have offered the subjects little or no incentive to think hard or
to get the "right" answer .... Do people tend to make better decisions when the stakes
are high? There is little evidence that they do.
Thaler, supra note 47, at 96 (emphasis in original).
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II. Observed Lawyer-Client Differences
A. Decisionmaking and the Impact of Reference Points
1. The Effect of "Frames" on Risk Preference. -Before deciding
whether to accept (or advise a client to accept) a settlement offer, the
litigant (or lawyer) must evaluate the offer relative to alternative options.
As is true in any decisionmaking process, lawyers and clients making
litigation decisions can be expected to use cognitive heuristics, or rules of
thumb, to guide them through this process.'
Psychologists have demonstrated that one tool people commonly
employ when making decisions of this kind is a "reference point"
heuristic. 3 People often evaluate options not only on the basis of their
absolute values, but also on the basis of the direction the options deviate
from a baseline reference point. The reference point separates potential
changes from that point into desirable outcomes ("gains") and undesirable
outcomes ("losses"). Researchers have demonstrated that whether potential
outcomes are coded as gains or losses can be an important determinant of
behavior in two related ways, which together underlie the well-known
descriptive model of decisionmaking called "prospect theory."'74
The first consequence of reference point coding is "loss aversion.'
Loss aversion refers to the observation that people tend to disfavor a loss
from a reference point more than they favor an equivalent gain.76
Psychologists have shown, for instance, that people will demand a much
greater amount of money to sell an item they own (i.e., absorb a loss) than
they will spend to buy the item if they do not already own it (i.e., achieve
a gain).7 Consider, for example, a woman who purchases a relatively
72. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV.
237, 237-38 (1973); cf. JOHN R. ANDERSON, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 156,
341 (4th ed. 1995) (identifying the tendency of real-world decisionmakers to rely on rules in assessing
particular situations rather than using more formal modes of deductive and inductive reasoning).
73. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed Feelings, 51
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296 (1992) (reviewing analyses and evidence
on the role of reference points and applying these data to the negotiation context).
74. For the first complete description of prospect theory, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMErRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter
Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory].
75. Kahneman, supra note 73, at 298 ("The general principle is straightforward: when an option
is compared to the reference point, the comparison is coded in terms of the advantages and
disadvantages of that option.").
76. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in
BARRIERS, supra note 21, at 54 ("Loss aversion refers to the observation that losses generally loom
larger than the corresponding gains.").
77. See Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory
of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663, 667-69 (1994) (describing the empirical
evidence of the gap between what people are willing to pay for an item and the price at which they
demand to sell the same item).
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inexpensive bottle of wine that appreciates in value to $100. Although she
declines to sell it for $100, she would refuse to buy it for $100 if she did
not already own it.78 On one hand, she would rather forego $100 than
lose the wine; on the other, acquiring the wine would not be worth $100.
A second consequence of reference point coding is termed the
"framing effect."79 Research indicates that people who are risk averse
when choosing among gains are often risk seeking when they face potential
losses. In other words, people often will take risks to avoid a certain loss
when they would refuse to take equivalent risks in pursuit of a gain of the
same magnitude. The results of a simple experiment illustrate the impres-
sive power of the framing effect. Researchers asked subjects to choose
between a certain gain of $240 and a 25% chance of gaining $1000; 84%
of the subjects preferred the certain gain, even though the other option has
an expected value that is $10 higher (25% chance x $1000 = $250).
Conversely, when subjects were given a choice between a certain loss of
$750 and a 75% chance of losing $1000, 87% of subjects preferred the
gamble, even though the expected value of the sure loss ($750) and the
gamble (75% x $1000 = $750) is the same."
Because litigants and lawyers often must choose between a certain
settlement offer and the uncertain prospects of trial, we hypothesized that
the framing effect might influence decisionmaking in litigation bargaining.
We predicted that disputants would be more likely to favor the certainty of
settlement over the risk of trial if the settlement is coded as a gain, rather
than a loss, from a reference point. To test this hypothesis, we designed
a scenario based on the most common of all torts-an automobile
collision-which we then gave to our litigant and lawyer subjects. We
provided subjects assigned to Group A the following set of facts concerning
"The Automobile Accident," a dispute between them (or their client) and
an automobile insurance company:
Description of the Facts of the Case:
Your [Your client's] new $14,000 Toyota Corolla was recently
totaled in an automobile accident that was clearly the other driver's
fault. You [Your client] sustained some injuries that required
medical treatment, but fortunately none of them were permanent and
you have [your client has] completely recovered. Your [Your
client's] $14,000 in medical bills were paid by your [a] health
78. The wine example is borrowed from Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer
Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 39, 43 (1980).
79. See Kahneman, supra note 73, at 297-98 (applying the framing effect to negotiation settings);
see also Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 74, at 268-69 (discovering that subjects
were more risk-averse when faced with the possibility of loss than when faced with the possibility of
gain).
80. See Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 46, at S255.
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insurance company, but you have [your client has] no automobile
insurance coverage that will pay to replace your [the] car.
The other driver has no money and is unemployed, so you
[your client] will not be able to collect any money directly from him.
However, he does have automobile insurance. You and your lawyer
have [After agreeing to represent this client, you] filed a lawsuit
against the insurance company, National Mutual, for $28,000-
$14,000 for the car, and $14,000 for the medical bills. You are not
asking for any pain and suffering damages. If you are able to
recover the $14,000 for the [your client's] medical bills, that will be
extra cash in your [your client's] pocket since your [the] health
insurance company has already paid your [your client's] doctors and
the hospital-it will be a windfall of $14,000.
National Mutual is not disputing that you [your client] suffered
$28,000 in damages, but it claims that the other driver's policy has
a maximum coverage value of $10,000 for accidents that occur while
driving a rental car. Since the other driver was driving a rental car
at the time of the accident, National Mutual has refused to pay more
than $10,000. Your lawyer has advised you [After conducting legal
and factual research, you have discovered] that the only issue in the
case is whether or not there is in fact a $10,000 limit on the policy
for this type of accident. If the case goes to trial, a judge will
review the policy and interpret its language. If a judge decides that
there is a limit, you [your client] will recover $10,000 at trial. If the
judge decides there is no such limit, you [your client] will recover
the full $28,000. Your lawyer has [You have] reviewed the policy
carefully and advised you [you have found] that the language is
extremely unclear-not unusual for the fine print in insurance
policies. He [You] cannot predict whether you are [your client is]
more likely to win or lose if the case goes to trial.
Question:
Following some discussions with your attorney [Following some
discussions], National Mutual has made you a total settlement offer
of $21,000-they will pay you [your client] that amount if you [your
client] will drop the lawsuit and agree not to make any other claims
against them. The company has told you this is its final offer and,
given the impracticality of any further meetings or discussions, you
have no reason to doubt that this is the case. Therefore, you must
[Therefore, you must advise your client to] either accept the offer or
reject it and go to trial. Your attorney [Your client] is a family
friend who is representing you for free [whom you are representing
for free], so legal fees should not affect your decision
[recommendation].
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Will you [Will you advise your client to]:
Definitely accept the offer
Probably accept the offer
Undecided
Probably reject the offer
Definitely reject the offer
We presented this same scenario to Group B litigants and lawyers, but
we altered a single variable for the Group B respondents. In version B of
the experiment, the plaintiff learned that he had been driving a $24,000
BMW rather than a $14,000 Toyota Corolla at the time of the accident.
Both Group A and B plaintiffs incurred the same amount of damages-
$28,000-but the damage breakdown was different: The BMW Drivers in
Group B suffered $24,000 in damage to the car and $4000 in reimbursed
medical expenses, while the Toyota Drivers in Group A suffered $14,000
in damage to the car and $14,000 in reimbursed medical expenses.
In absolute terms, Group A and B subjects faced precisely the same
choice. Both sets of subjects were required to choose either a certain
recovery of $21,000 or the chance to recover $28,000 at trial, coupled with
the risk of recovering only $10,000 at trial. The attorney's inability to
predict which trial outcome was more likely suggests that the trial option
could be described as a fifty percent chance of recovering $28,000 coupled
with a fifty percent chance of recovering $10,000; that is, an option with
a $19,000 expected value (50% x $28,000 .+ 50% x $10,000 =
$19,000). 1  Thus, for subjects in both Group A and Group B, the
expected (and indeed, the actual) value of the $21,000 settlement offer was
$2000 greater than the expected value of trial.
Although Group A and B subjects faced the same choice from an
expected financial value perspective, they might have perceived that choice
differently if they evaluated the options from a pre-accident (rather than a
post-accident) reference point. Group A subjects-Toyota Drivers-were
reimbursed $14,000 by the health insurance company for medical costs
associated with the accident. The $21,000 settlement offer promised to
leave them $7000 better off than they were before the accident; that is,
they could replace their lost automobile, if they so chose, and still have
$7000 remaining (-$28,000 + $14,000 + $21,000 = $7000). Thus,
settlement could be coded as a gain relative to the pre-accident reference
point. The $19,000 expected value of a trial is superior to their pre-
accident position (-$28,000 + $14,000 + $19,000 = $5000), but with
81. Subjects need not have inferred from the attorney's analysis that their chances of prevailing
at trial were exactly 50%. Whether individual subjects made different assumptions about their trial
chances does not affect the validity of the experimental results as long as Group A and Group B
subjects did not draw systematically different inferences from the same analysis.
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potential actual awards of $10,000 or $28,000, a trial could leave them
better or worse off than they were prior to the accident.
Subjects in Group B-BMW Drivers-were also reimbursed for their
medical expenses, but these totaled only $4000. Thus, the $21,000 settle-
ment offer, if accepted, would leave them $3000 worse off than they were
prior to the accident; that is, it would not enable them to replace the lost
$24,000 automobile (-$28,000 + $4000 + $21,000 = -$3000).
Consequently, these subjects could have coded settlement as a loss relative
to the pre-accident reference point. Although the $19,000 expected value
of a trial is inferior to settlement, a trial, with its possibility of a $28,000
award, provided the only chance of avoiding a result that could be
perceived as a loss.'
The wealth-maximizing choice for Toyota and BMW Drivers (and
their lawyers) was to accept the settlement offer: for all subjects, the actual
value of settlement was $2000 higher than the expected value of trial.
Risk-seeking subjects in either group might have preferred trial.
Nevertheless, because the BMW Drivers could code the settlement offer as
a loss from their pre-accident position, while trial allowed for the
possibility of avoiding such a loss, we hypothesized that more BMW
Drivers than Toyota Drivers would opt for the risky option of trial.
Our results strongly support this hypothesis for litigants, but not for
lawyers. Litigant subjects in both experimental groups favored settlement
over trial, but that preference was much weaker for the BMW Drivers.
The mean response given by Toyota Drivers was 4.43, midway between
"definitely accept" and "probably accept,"while the mean response given
by BMW Drivers was only 3.64, somewhat below "probably accept."1
3
The difference between the two groups is statistically significant.'
Perhaps more telling, only one Toyota Driver out of forty-two subjects said
he or she would "probably reject" or "definitely reject" the offer, in con-
trast to nine of forty-four BMW drivers who would "probably reject" or
"definitely reject" the offer, with an additional seven undecided. The dif-
ference between the groups strongly suggests that a significant number of
BMW Drivers framed settlement as a certain loss and selected a risky trial
with a lower expected value in an effort to avoid accepting that loss.'
82. Note that if subjects evaluated their options from the reference point of their post-accident
position, both Toyota and BMW Drivers would view the settlement offer, the expected value of trial,
and the possible actual values of trial as gains of various magnitudes.
83. See infra Figure 1.
84. t (77) = 3. 6 5 ,p < .01.
85. The litigant responses could conceivably result from risk aversion. Although the subjects were
randomly assigned to be BMW or Toyota Drivers, they might have taken cues from the group to which
they were assigned. The BMW Drivers might have imagined that they were wealthy and thus less
concerned with the possibility of losing at trial than were the Toyota Drivers. Although we cannot
definitively refute this explanation, we can think of no reason why, if litigant subjects were so affected,
the lawyer subjects were not similarly affected. In other words, if this explanation were correct, we
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Figure 1-The Automobile Accident
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By contrast, our experimental manipulation had virtually no effect on
the lawyer subjects. Lawyers for the Toyota Drivers strongly favored the
settlement offer: forty-five subjects provided a mean response of 4.58 on
the five-point scale. Lawyers for BMW Drivers provided almost identical
responses: the forty-five subjects in that group gave a mean response of
4.51, statistically indistinguishable from the average score of the Toyota
Driver lawyers.86 Only one BMW Driver lawyer recommended rejecting
the settlement offer (as did one Toyota Driver lawyer).' Most
importantly, the interaction between the subject pools (litigant versus
lawyer) and the condition (BMW versus Toyota) was statistically signifi-
cant, suggesting it is highly unlikely that the different responses of the
lawyers and litigants to the experimental stimulus was coincidental.88 In
would have expected the lawyers also to assume their BMW Driver subjects were wealthier and
therefore less risk averse than their Toyota Driver subjects.
86. t (88) = .49, p = .62.
87. The lawyer responses could possibly be explained by self-interest. Because lawyer subjects
were told that they were representing their client free of charge, they might have favored settlement-
regardless of the value of trial and, therefore, regardless of the experimental group to which they were
randomly assigned-to avoid the opportunity cost of devoting further time and energy to a case
generating no revenue. Such a desire conceivably could be strong enough to swamp any effects that
the frame might otherwise have had, producing an overwhelming preference for settlement among
members of both experimental groups. Without taking a position on how often lawyers are apt to put
their own financial interests above their clients' interests, we strongly believe that few would do so in
our experimental setting as there was no cost associated with ethical behavior. This prediction is borne
out by the third experiment that we discuss in this Article, in which lawyers who were advised that they
were representing their clients free of charge preferred trial to settlement, on average. This experiment
is discussed in subpart II(B), infra. If financial self-interest explains the lawyers' responses to the
automobile accident scenario, it should explain their responses to all of the experimental scenarios.
88. F(1, 172) = 8.1, p < .01.
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other words, the litigants as a class appeared to take into account whether
the settlement offer appeared to be a gain or loss from a pre-accident
reference point, even when doing so caused them to reject the option that
would maximize their expected financial return from litigation, while the
lawyers apparently did not.
The explanations that the lawyers provided for their recommendations
further illuminate the statistical results.89 By and large, lawyers indicated
that they used expected value calculations to decide whether to recommend
settlement or trial. That is, the vast majority of the lawyer subjects
explained that they made recommendations based on a comparison of the
$21,000 settlement offer to the $19,000 expected value of trial.' There
was no noticeable difference in the considerations that motivated lawyers
representing Toyota Drivers and those representing BMW Drivers."
Notably, no lawyer respondents mentioned either that the settlement offer
was insufficient for the client to replace his lost BMW or, alternatively,
that it was more than sufficient to replace the lost Toyota. On the few
occasions that lawyers referred to considerations other than the expected
monetary values of the settlement offer and potential trial verdicts, they
mentioned the hidden financial and emotional costs of the litigation
process. 92
2. The Initial Settlement Offer as an Expectation Anchor.-The
preceding section explains that decisionmakers often employ a reference
point to classify potential outcomes as gains or losses and that decisions can
be based, at least in part, on the different risk preferences that these
classifications can create. Although, as demonstrated, this decisionmaking
process can lead to choices that clearly deviate from wealth maximization,
the process seems somewhat intuitive-at least in The Automobile Accident
scenario. That is, a litigant's pre-accident situation in that scenario seems
like a relevant referent for an accident victim to use.
89. To better understand the decisionmaking processes of our lawyer subjects, we invited each
lawyer subject to explain why he or she made various recommendations. Sixty-nine of the 90 lawyer
participants (77%) accepted the invitation. We placed the request for explanation at the end of the
survey materials in an attempt to minimize its impact on the subjects' responses, although we think this
was probably unnecessary: we believe lawyers typically feel obligated to explain their recommendations
to their clients.
90. For example, one subject wrote: "If win, receive $28K. If lose, receive $10K. Assuming
50/50 probability of winning or losing, I would take the $21K every time." Attorney Survey #37 (on
file with authors).
91. One lawyer representing a BMW Driver recommended that his client "definitely accept" the
settlement offer because "[t]he offer exceeds the expected value of the case (at 50% probability)."
Attorney Survey #90 (on file with authors). Another recommended his client "definitely accept" the
offer because of "[s]imple statistics .... If the case is 50/50, [the offer] is a deal." Attorney Survey
#2 (on file with authors).
92. One trial lawyer wrote that accepting the offer was a "'no brainer' considering emotional and
financial costs of litigation." Attorney Survey #9 (on file with authors).
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More surprising is the extent to which an obviously irrelevant referent
can influence decisionmaking. Cognitive psychologists have demonstrated
that decisionmakers' choices are frequently affected by information
anchors.93 That is, people have a tendency to allow information to which
they have previously been exposed to anchor their expectations-even when
the information bears no relation to the choice faced-which can lead to
discounting objectively relevant information when making decisions.'
In one study of this phenomenon, Joyce and Biddle divided profes-
sional auditors into two groups and exposed each to a different anchor.95
The members of Group A were asked to indicate whether they thought
management fraud occurred in more than ten of the one thousand compa-
nies audited by Big Eight accounting firms. Group B members were asked
to indicate whether they thought management fraud occurred in more than
two hundred of the one thousand companies audited by the Big Eight firms.
The experimenters tested whether these numerical anchors- "ten" for
Group A, "two hundred" for Group B-would influence responses to the
second question they asked members of both groups: "What is your
estimate of the number of Big Eight clients per 1,000 that have significant
executive-level management fraud?" Group A subjects estimated an
average of 16.52 incidents of fraud per thousand, while Group B subjects
estimated an average of 43.11 incidents of fraud per thousand.96 The
anchors-which conveyed no meaningful information about the issue the
subjects were asked to address-systematically influenced subjects'
estimates .97
93. See Kahneman, supra note 73, at 308, 307-10 ("Anchoring effects will be explained as cases
in which a stimulus or message that is clearly designated as irrelevant and uninformative nevertheless
increases the normality of a possible outcome.").
94. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128-30 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment]. Tversky and
Kahneman explain:
In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is
adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial value, or starting point, may be suggested
by the formulation of the problem, or it may be the result of a partial computation. In
either case, adjustments are typically insufficient. That is, different starting points yield
different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values. We call this phenomenon
anchoring.
Id. at 1128 (footnote omitted).
95. See Edward J. Joyce & Gary C. Biddle, Anchoring and Adjustment in Probabilistic Inference
in Auditing, 19 J. Acr. REs. 120, 123 (1981).
96. See id. at 125.
97. In another study illustrating the same decisionmaking bias, Tversky and Kahneman asked
subjects to estimate the percentage of African countries in the United Nations. Before asking the
subjects for their final estimates, the researchers asked them to spin a random number wheel. The
number wheel was fixed to land on 1 of 2 anchors: 10 or 65. Subjects were then asked to estimate
whether the number they received on the wheel was higher or lower than the percentage of African
countries in the United Nations. Then, they were asked to give their best estimate of that percentage.
Although the wheel-generated numbers were clearly unrelated to the task at hand, subjects allowed these
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In some situations, of course, anchors provide useful shortcuts to
expected value calculations, obviating the need to independently evaluate
all decision options.9 To the extent an anchor provides information
relevant to the value of a decision option, reliance on it might lead to the
same decision choice that an independent valuation would produce or, at
least, might lead to an optimal balance between the quality of a decision
and the time and effort invested in reaching it. But when an anchor does
not represent a competent market valuation or when market valuations are
irrelevant, reliance on that anchor can lead to suboptimal decisions.
We hypothesized that in litigation bargaining an opening settlement
offer made by an adversary might anchor a party's expectations about the
outcome of the litigation and thus affect his or her choice between litigation
options. To test the differential effect that an opening settlement offer
might have on our litigant and lawyer subjects, we gave two groups of
each a hypothetical litigation scenario entitled "The Lemon." Litigants and
lawyers assigned to Group A received the following information:
Description of the Facts of the Case
Recently, you [your client] purchased a brand new BMW 318
automobile from your [a] local dealer for $24,000. Much to your
[your client's] disappointment, the car has one major problem that
you were unable to detect when you test-drove it [that was unde-
tected during the test-drive]: it occasionally stalls at stop lights and
stop signs and is extremely difficult to start in the morning. While
these problems do not make it dangerous to drive, they have cut
down on your [your client's] enjoyment of the car. You have [She
has] had BMW mechanics look at the car twice but BMW claims that
the car is not defective and there is nothing that can be done to "fix"
it. "Some cars just stall more often than others," they told you
[her]. You [She] took the car to your [her] own mechanic, and he
agreed with the dealer that the problem could not be improved. Due
to what you perceive [your client perceives] as a defect, you have
[she has] asked the dealer to take the car back and give you [her] a
refund. At this point, you [she] would rather buy a different model
of car. The dealer has refused to refund your [her] money.
You have retained an attorney and [She retained you and you]
filed a lawsuit against the dealer seeking a refund of your [your
client's] money. Your lawyer has informed you [After conducting
numbers to influence their responses. The median estimate of subjects who landed on 10 was 25%,
while the median estimate of subjects who landed on 65 was 45%! See Tversky & Kahneman, supra
note 94, at 1128; see also NEALE & BAZERMAN, supra note 41, at 48-50 (reviewing the results of
anchoring experiments).
98. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 94, at 1131 (noting that anchoring and other heuristics
"are highly economical and usually effective" even though they do "lead to systematic and predictable
errors").
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legal and factual research, you have learned] that the only legal issue
is whether or not the car is, in fact, "defective," due to the problems
you have [your client has] recognized. If the case goes to trial, this
will be a question for a jury to decide. If a jury decides the car's
problems amount to a "defect," the dealer will have to take the car
back and give you [your client] a complete refund of your [her]
money. If the jury decides the problems do not amount to a
"defect," you [your client] will have to keep the car and will not be
entitled to any refund at all. Your lawyer thinks [You think] this is
a very close case, and could easily go either way.
Initially, the BMW dealer offered to refund $2000 of the
purchase price if you [your client] would drop the lawsuit and keep
the car. You rejected the offer [Following your advice, she rejected
the offer]. Now, with the trial date approaching, the dealer has
asked for another meeting with you and your attorney [your client]
to discuss the possibility of settling the case out of court.
Question:
At the meeting with you and your lawyer [your client], the
BMW dealer offered to settle the case by refunding $12,000 of the
purchase price if you [your client would] agree to keep the car and
drop your [the] lawsuit. The dealer told you that this is his final
offer, and given the impracticality of further meetings or discussions
prior to trial, you have no reason to doubt that this is the case.
Therefore, you must [you must advise your client to] either accept
the offer or reject it and proceed to trial. Your lawyer has agreed to
represent you [You have agreed to represent this client] for free in
this case, so considerations of legal fees should not affect your
decision [recommendation] about accepting or rejecting the offer.
Will you [Will you advise your client to]:
Definitely accept the settlement offer
Probably accept the settlement offer
Undecided
Probably reject the settlement offer
Definitely reject the settlement offer
Group B subjects received the same scenario, but for one difference:
they learned they had declined an initial $10,000 offer, rather than the
$2000 initial offer Group A subjects learned they had declined.
Thus, after the final settlement offer was made, Group A and B sub-
jects faced an identical choice: to accept a $12,000 settlement (plus the
right to keep the defective car) or to proceed to trial, accepting a chance
to recover $24,000 (and return the car) along with the risk of recovering
nothing (but retaining the defective car). Thus, the expected (and actual)
value of the settlement offer was $12,000 plus the value of the car. The
[Vol. 76:77
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expected value of trial was approximately fifty percent of $24,000 (that is,
$12,000) plus fifty percent of the value of the car.
As was the case in the Automobile Accident scenario, Group A and
B subjects in the Lemon scenario would have evaluated the options
identically, on average, if they based their evaluations only on the expected
financial values of the two options.99  Psychological research on
anchoring, however, led us to hypothesize that the initial anchors to which
subjects were exposed-a $2000 opening offer for Group A versus a
$10,000 opening offer for Group B-would cause subjects to evaluate
decisions differently depending on the version of the scenario they
received.
As we found in the Automobile Accident scenario, litigants in the
Lemon scenario were more likely than their lawyer counterparts to deviate
from the result that an expected value calculation would dictate. The
independent variable in the Lemon scenario-the opening offer-had a sta-
tistically significant effect on the likelihood that litigant subjects would
accept the final settlement offer,"° but it did not have a significant effect
on the likelihood that lawyer subjects would advise their clients to accept
the offer. Litigants receiving the $2000 initial offer favored accepting the
final offer, providing a mean response of 3.54. Litigants receiving the
$10,000 initial offer were more likely to reject the offer than accept it,
providing a mean score of 2.97.101 We believe the difference between
the groups can be explained most plausibly as follows: the $10,000 initial
offer anchored the expectations of Group B litigants so high that the small
increase offered from $10,000 to $12,000 made the final offer seem
unattractive relative to that expectation, whereas the $2000 initial offer
anchored the expectations of Group A litigants so low that the increase to
$12,000 seemed very attractive.1°2
99. Due to the values provided in the hypothetical scenario, all risk-neutral subjects calculating
the expected values of the choices should have opted for settlement if they placed a positive value on
the car and for trial if they placed a negative value on it.
100. t (68) = 1.96, p < .05.
101. See infra Figure 2.
102. A related explanation is that the parties who received the $10,000 initial offer believed that
the BMW Dealer acted arrogantly by making only a relatively small concession from his initial
position. Cf. HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 48 (1982) (advising
negotiators not to "embarrass your bargaining partner by forcing him or her to make all the
concessions").
Proponents of the standard economic models of settlement might argue that these results are not
inconsistent with expected value calculations. Specifically, proponents might suggest two other
explanations for why the opening offers produced different response rates to final offers.
First, an opening offer might communicate information about the likelihood of possible trial out-
comes. A high offer, for example, may indicate that the offeror possesses some evidence favorable to
the offeree's position that he fears will come to light at trial. In a tort suit, for example, the defendant
might have more information about whether he behaved negligently than the plaintiff has, and he may
fear the repercussions of that material coming to light at trial. Alternatively, a high offer might indicate
1997]
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Figure 2-The Lemon
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By contrast, the value of the initial settlement offer did not have a
significant effect on the lawyer subjects. Both Group A and B lawyers
were inclined to recommend the settlement offer. The group that received
the $2000 opening offer provided a mean response of 3.76, while the
group that received the $10,000 opening offer provided a mean response
that the offeror's attorney believes the offeree is more likely to win in court than the offeree's attorney
does. In that same tort suit, regardless of private information, the defendant's lawyer might simply
believe that the plaintiff has a better chance of winning at trial than the plaintiff's own attorney
believes. This could, paradoxically, prompt plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneysto decline high settlement
offers because they believe that they can win big at trial.
Second, a settlement offer might communicate information about the offeror's willingness to
engage in extended pretrial procedures. A litigant unconcerned with the expense of pretrial
maneuvering may attempt a form of price-discriminating behavior, beginning with a low offer followed
by minimal increases in an effort to secure cheap settlements from adversaries financially unable or
emotionally unwilling to engage in protracted litigation.
Neither of the rational actor accounts satisfactorily explains the differences between Group A and
B litigants in our scenario. As to the fist point, we eliminate the possibility that the initial settlement
offer contained any informational content by providing subjects in both groups with an identical final
settlement offer. Because a $12,000 final offer is made by the car dealership in both versions of the
scenario, defendant's private information or trial predictions that might reasonably cause the plaintiff
and plaintiff's attorney to reassess the value of a trial verdict should be reflected in that final offer.
While a $2000 settlement offer standing alone could signal different information than a $10,000
settlement offer standing alone, a final settlement offer contains all relevant information concerning the
expected value of a trial verdict.
Moreover, the finality of the $12,000 offer in our scenario eliminates any procedural posturing
on the part of the defendant or plaintiff. While the $2000 offer might have, at one time, signaled a
financial commitment to protracted litigation that might have, in turn, encouraged settlement, the
extension of a "final offer" and the lack of time for further negotiation before trial indicate that such
a screening strategy has failed to pressure the plaintiff into a quick settlement. The fact that the
defendant who initially makes a low settlement offer might have an appetite for pretrial posturing is no
longer relevant to the settlement decision.
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of 3.49, l 3 a slight but nonsignificant difference."°  The contrast
between the lawyer and litigant responses suggests the hypothesis for future
testing that the evaluation of options by the lawyer subjects was less
influenced by the opening-offer anchor. 5 Unlike the results of the
Automobile Accident scenario, however, the interaction between the subject
pools (litigants and lawyers) and the opening offers ($2000 and $10,000)
was not statistically significant," ° meaning that we cannot reject the
possibility that the greater effect of the anchor on the litigant subjects was
due to chance rather than a real difference in how the two pools of subjects
responded to the presence of different anchors.
Although the statistical analysis is inconclusive, the anecdotal
responses of the lawyer subjects support the hypothesis that the lawyer
subjects were less affected by the opening offer anchor. As was true in the
Automobile Accident scenario, the lawyers' written explanations for their
recommendations-regardless of whether they represented clients that
received the $2000 or $10,000 opening offer-did not discuss the indepen-
dent variable. The explanations typically explicitly or implicitly focused
on a comparison of the expected monetary values of the two options. 7
Many lawyers suggested that by accepting the $12,000 offer and selling the
car the client could likely achieve a better financial result than even the
best possible trial verdict ($24,000 with the dealer taking the car back)
would provide.0 8
103. See supra Figure 2.
104. t (88) = 1.12, p = .27. Because of the gap, albeit a statistically insignificant one, between
the two lawyer groups, the two-way ANOVA test comparing the difference between the lawyer groups
to the difference between the litigant groups failed to reach the level of statistical significance.
Therefore, the difference between how lawyers and litigants responded to this experiment is less robust
than the difference between how the two populations responded to the automobile accident scenario.
105. As is the case with the Automobile Accident scenario, responses from litigant subjects in the
Lemon scenario could be explained by a different effect of the independent variable than we have
hypothesized. Subjects that received the $10,000 initial offer might have considered, in true role-
playing fashion, what kind of a person they must be to have rejected that offer. They might have then
decided that if they were in fact a person who would reject $10,000, they would probably also reject
$12,000. Subjects who received the $2000 initial offer might not have felt constrained from accepting
the final offer. If this explanation were correct, however, we would have expected the lawyer subjects
to respond in the same way. That they did not reinforces the explanatory power of the anchoring
effect.
106. F(1, 156) = 1.05,p = .3.
107. Similar to the Automobile Accident explanations, a few lawyers explained their
recommendations to settle by reference to hidden emotional or financial risks of trial. See, e.g.,
Attorney Survey #35 (on file with authors) ("If she does not take the settlement, she has to go in front
of a jury complaining that her BMW (luxury car for rich people) isn't as much fun as it should be.
The settlement avoids that along with trial stress, and she is unlikely to end up worse off financially.").
108. See, e.g., Attorney Survey #83 (on file with authors) ("Take $12K, [and] sell [the] car.
Miles ahead! Someone would pay $12K plus for a new BMW which has these problems."); Attorney
Survey #59 (on file with authors) ("Client gets $12,000 plus gets to keep the car-which she could sell.
She may end up with more [than trial will yield], if she gets a good price for the car."). Interestingly,
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B. Equity Seeking
The interpersonal relationship between the parties may also influence
litigation decisionmaking even when those dynamics do not affect the
expected value of competing decision choices." According to equity
theorists, who study the impact of interpersonal relationships on individual
behavior, parties in relationships "attempt to maintain proportionality
between inputs and outcomes to themselves [in] comparison [to]
others.""' Individuals in inequitable relationships tend to feel distressed,
and they try to eliminate that distress by restoring equity to the
relationship."' We hypothesized that the equity-seeking impulse might
influence litigant and lawyer settlement behavior, enticing the subjects to
stray from choices that would maximize expected wealth.
Our experimental results suggest, however, that just as lawyers are
less likely than litigants to allow reference points and possibly anchors to
affect their decisions, they are also less likely to permit interpersonal
considerations to influence their evaluation of litigation options."
Consider the following scenario-"The Broken Heater." Group A litigants
and lawyers were given the following information:
Description of the Facts of the Case
Late last summer, you [your client, a college student] began
looking off-campus for an apartment for the upcoming school year.
You [Your client] finally found a satisfactory apartment, but the
though, none of the lawyer responses explicitly identified that the settlement offer had a higher expected
value than trial so long as the car had any resale value.
109. See Mnookin & Ross, supra note 35, at 11 ("A proposed change in the status quo.. . may
be rejected even when it offers indisputable advantages over maintenance of that status quo, and even
when the future offers no realistic hope of more favorable terms, simply because the proposal violates
one party's or both parties' sense of fairness or equity.").
110. George F. Loewenstein et al., Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts,
57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 426, 426 (1989) (summarizing ELAINE WALSTER Er AL.,
EQUITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH (1978), which reviewed more than four hundred equity studies).
111. See Elaine Walster et al., New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 151, 153-54 (1973).
112. Of course the personal relationship at issue in our scenario involved the litigant and a land-
lord rather than the lawyer and a landlord. Some might argue that the different results we obtained
between litigants and lawyers say nothing about how equity-seeking influences the two groups, but it
instead suggests that equity-seeking affects only those parties whose relationships have been directly
affected by the other in the relationship. Thus, the argument goes, if the relationship at issue in the
scenario involved the lawyer and his counterpart representing the landlord, perhaps the lawyers would
have behaved just as the litigants behaved in our study, and perhaps the litigants would have behaved
just as the lawyers in our study.
This is an astute observation, but we do have some data that call its accuracy into question.
While it is true that our litigant subjects were influenced more by the landlord's good or bad behavior
than the lawyers as a whole, a subgroup of the lawyers-the transactional attorneys-were just as
affected by the landlord's behavior as the litigants. This suggests to us that lawyers in general, and
litigators in particular, do respond differently than litigants when equity-seeking concerns arise in
litigation.
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landlord would agree only to a six-month lease. After careful delib-
eration, you [your client] signed a six-month lease and agreed to pay
$1000 per month in rent. On September 1, you [your client] moved
into your [the] new apartment.
Everything was fine for two months. Around Halloween,
through no fault of your own [your client], the heater in your [the]
apartment broke down. You [Your client] left a message with the
landlord, requesting immediate repair due to the ensuing winter
weather. You [Your client] did not hear anything from the landlord,
so you [your client] called him again the next day. The landlord
promised to fix your [the] heater, but he never did. A week later,
you [your client] called him again. Again, he promised to fix it, but
he never did. Over the next several weeks, you [your client] called
him a half-dozen times, but he did not return your [any of the] calls.
For four months (Nov., Dec., Jan., and Feb.), you [your client]
lived without heat but continued to pay your [the] rent in full.
Although you were [your client was] able to borrow a small space
heater from a friend, it failed to keep the apartment from feeling cold
and drafty throughout the winter. When your [the] lease expired,
you [your client] moved out and found a new apartment.
After moving out, you [your client] told a friend what had
happened to you [what had happened], and she advised you [your
client] to seek legal advice through the ASSU" 3 [the college's
student government legal service, where you are working part time
as a volunteer attorney]. You met with an ASSU attorney, who
advised you [You met with your client, conducted legal and factual
research, and discovered] that there was a good chance that you
[your client] could recover a portion of the $4000 rent you [your
client] paid during those four, cold months. Accordingly, with the
attorney's assistance [with your client's permission], you filed suit
against the landlord in small claims court for failing to heat your
[your client's] apartment. Prior to the small claims court trial, you
[you and your client] agreed to meet with the landlord.
Question:
At the meeting, the landlord made you [your client] a settlement
offer of $900 if you [your client] would agree to drop the lawsuit.
He told you that it was the highest offer he would make, and given
the impracticality of any further meetings or discussions, there is no
reason to doubt him. Therefore, you must [you must advise your
client to] either accept the offer or reject it and go to small claims
court.
113. "ASSU" is the abbreviation for the Associated Students of Stanford University, a Stanford
student government organization that provides free legal counseling to students.
1997]
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Will you [Will you advise your client to]:
Definitely accept the offer
Probably accept the offer
Undecided
Probably reject the offer
Definitely reject the offer
Again, litigant and lawyer subjects randomly assigned to experimental
Group B received the same scenario as the one given to Group A, with a
single difference. Instead of being told that the landlord had failed to
return numerous phone calls, Group B subjects were informed that the
landlord had been unable to have the heater repaired because he had been
out of the country dealing with a "family emergency."
This manipulation caused a statistically significant shift in preferences
on the part of litigant subjects.11 4 Group A subjects ("Broken Promise"
subjects) were more likely to reject the settlement offer than accept it,
providing a mean response of 2.60, while Group B subjects ("Family
Emergency" subjects) were more likely to accept the offer and avoid small
claims court, responding, on average, 3.41.115
Although the experiment was designed to provide subjects in Groups
A and B with the same legal endowment should they reject the settlement
and go to court, one plausible explanation for the divergent responses is
that subjects presumed that the quality of the landlord's excuse (or lack
thereof) for failing to provide heat would affect the expected recovery in
small claims court. To rule out this hypothesis, we gave a third group of
litigant subjects (Group C) the same scenario we gave to Group A, but we
added the following paragraph at the end of the scenario:
Keep in mind when making your decision that whether you win
or lose in small claims court and how much the court might award
you will be based on the fact that the landlord failed to provide heat
for four months. The fact that the landlord behaved badly toward
you by promising to fix the heater but never following through might
have made you more upset, but whether the landlord had a sympa-
thetic excuse for failing to provide the heat will not concern the
court.
Even with this explicit explanation that the quality of the landlord's
excuse would not affect the plaintiff's legal rights, subjects in Group C
provided a mean response of 2.69, statistically indistinguishable from the
2.60 response provided by the Group A subjects,, who responded to the
same scenario without the explicit disclaimer.
114. t (115) = 3.24,p < .01.
115. See infra Figure 3.
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Because the divergent responses between Group A and B litigants do
not appear to be caused by a perceived difference in legal endowments, we
suggest that the most plausible explanation for the difference is that the
Broken Promise subjects felt the need to recover more from the litigation
process than money: they also sought official recognition that the landlord
had behaved badly or that their claim was valid. The Family Emergency
subjects, by contrast, felt less need for this remedy because the landlord,
while failing to fulfill his contractual obligation, did not behave in a
morally objectionable manner-he at least had a sympathetic excuse for his
failure to behave responsibly. Therefore, while some Broken Promise
subjects that felt $900 was adequate monetary compensation might have
demanded their day in court anyway, subjects in the Family Emergency
group who believed $900 was adequate compensation had no reason to
decline the offer.
Figure 3-The Broken Heater
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The lawyer subjects, by contrast, did not appear to be conflicted about
the goals of the litigation or to be influenced by the equity-seeking
construct. Group A lawyers, those representing clients to whom the
landlord provided no excuse for failing to fix the heater, gave a mean
response of 2.80. Group B lawyers, representing clients whose landlord
was out of the country due to family emergency, responded with an
average score of 3.02.111 Although the difference suggests that perhaps
the decisions of some lawyers were affected by the landlord's excuse, it
falls far short of statistical significance. 1 7 The interaction between the
subject pools and the landlord's excuses-that is, the difference between the
116. See supra Figure 3.
117. rt(87) = .088, p = .38.
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effect the excuse had on the litigant subjects and on the lawyer subjects-
approached significance, although it fell short according to the usual
conventions."'
Most of the Broken Heater lawyers appear to have approached this
scenario precisely as they approached the scenarios testing the effects of
frames and anchors. That is, the attorneys attempted to assess whether the
$900 settlement offer, relative to the trial option, made good financial
sense. The psychological variable-equity-seeking-did not significantly
influence the attorneys' perception of the landlord's settlement offer as
more or less desirable than trial. Thus, again, relative to the litigants at
least, the lawyers seemed generally uninfluenced by a psychological consid-
eration that does not affect the expected financial value of litigation
options. " 9
118. F(1, 204) = 2 .5
9 , p < .11.
119. The results of our experiments do not reveal precisely why our litigants and lawyers
approached the settlement decision differently. At least two competing hypotheses are possible: (1)
lawyers are less affected by psychological factors because of their role as agents, rather than principles,
in the dispute, which either (a) causes them to perceive the choice differently, or (b) imbues them with
the belief that this role obligates them to base their recommendations on dispassionate analysis rather
than more emotional factors (the "role" hypothesis); or (2) regardless of role, lawyers tend to see the
world differently than nonlawyers as a result of (a) differences between those who choose to enter the
legal profession and the general population, (b) legal education, or (c) experience practicing law (the
.population" hypothesis).
The results of other research provide some empirical support for both the population and role
hypotheses. In a recent study, Rachlinski demonstrated that a group of undergraduate students playing
the role of lawyers were susceptible to the framing effect. See Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 135-38.
Because placing subjects in the role of a lawyer did not appear to mitigate the effect of frames,
Rachlinski's results suggest, by implication, that the differences between our experimental subjects
might be better explained by the population hypothesis (and, more specifically, by either legal education
or professional experience).
In a study of how fee-shifting rules might affect settlement decisions, Rowe and Vidmar used
two different hypothetical lawsuit scenarios to test the extent to which experimental subjects' preference
for settlement would increase under procedural rules that made unsuccessful plaintiffs responsible for
defendants' legal fees. See Rowe & Vidmar, supra note 56, at 13. In the first scenario, modeled after
a personal injury case, Duke University law students playing the role of the plaintiff were not
statistically more likely to accept a given settlement offer when the fee-shifting rule placed an increasing
amount of risk upon plaintiffs that demand adjudication-a result in conflict with the authors' prediction
that rational plaintiffs' preference for adjudication would decrease as risk increases. See id. at 23-27.
In the second scenario, modeled after a civil rights case testing the same hypotheses as the tort
scenario, Duke University law students-this time playing the role of the plaintiff's attorney-were
statistically more likely to accept a given settlement offer when the fee-shifting rule placed a greater
risk on plaintiffs who declined settlement offers. See id. at 27-29 (producing statistically significant
results, p < .01). In other words, members of the same population-in this case Duke University law
students-made decisions in a way that conforms with the predictions of economic models (that assume
rational behavior and a desire to maximize wealth) when they were agents but not when they were
principals. Although Rowe and Vidmar were not attempting to explore the differences in
decisionmaking between law students playing the role of lawyers and those playing the role of plaintiffs,
their results incidentally provide some support for the role hypothesis.
Understanding the precise reason for the different responses of our litigant and lawyer subjects
is not necessary to evaluate the implications of the differences and was consequently beyond the scope
HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  112 1997-1998
1997] Psychology, Economics, and Settlement
III. Testing the Impact Lawyers Have on the Settlement Decision
Our lawyer subjects were not affected to nearly the same degree as our
litigant subjects by the framing, anchoring, and equity-seeking variables
tested. Whether this difference is important to the resolution of legal
disputes depends not only on whether the experimental results are general-
izable to lawyers and litigants outside the experimental setting, but also on
the precise role lawyers play vis-d-vis litigants in settlement
decisionmaking.
The client, rather than the lawyer, will be the ultimate arbiter of
whether to accept or reject a settlement offer. This is, of course, the pre-
vailing rule of legal ethics: The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provide that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept
an offer of settlement of a matter.""' This rule is subject to limited
exceptions-for example, when a client is a minor or mentally
disturbed'-but when a client is competent, it is hard and fast."
More fundamentally, the structure of the market for legal services, by its
very nature, ensures that clients will be the ultimate decisionmakers: the
client-assuming she can pay for legal representation-always retains the
ability to fire her attorney and seek alternative representation.
23
of this project. Determining which of the competing hypotheses has the most explanatory power,
however, would further our understanding of the role of lawyers in the litigation process, and could
be a fruitful topic of future research.
120. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1995). The ABA Code provides
that "it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer," MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980), and reminds that "[i]n the final analysis... the lawyer
should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods
because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself." Id. at EC 7-8. See
generally Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049 (1984) (discussing the Model Rules as both a
restatement of law and a normative directive within a variety of attorney-client relationships). Under
the prevailing ethical rules, the lawyer has the authority to determine litigation tactics, an area in which
the lawyer is presumed to have substantial expertise. See Poole v. United States, 832 F.2d 561, 564
(I Ith Cir. 1987) (holding that an attorney's stipulation of an easily-proved element of an offense was
tactical in nature and did not require the defendant's consent).
121. Even in these circumstances, the Model Rules suggest the client should be permitted, as far
as it is practical, to make such decisions. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1. 14(a)
(1995) ("When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the
representation is impaired, whether because of minority, mental disability or for some other reason,
the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the
client."). The Model Code provides, somewhat more directly, that "[a]ny mental or physical condition
of a client that renders him incapable of making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts
additional responsibilities upon his lawyer." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12
(1980).
122. See generally Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Conduct of Attorney in Connection with
Settlement of Client's Case as Groundfor Disciplinary Action, 92 A.L.R. 3D 288,291 (1979 & Supp.
1996) (recognizing the rule that an attorney has "no implied authority to compromise and settle his
client's claim" and collecting relevant cases).
123. But cf. Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 882-84, 889-98 (1990) (arguing that lawyers have enough marketHeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  113 1997-1998
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While we assume that the client will serve as the ultimate decision-
maker in the settlement context, we also assume that the lawyer has the
potential to influence her client's decisionmaking by serving as her client's
educator, her advisor, or both. In this Part, building on the previous set
of experiments, we begin to explore how effectively lawyers can function
as educator or advisor in litigation settlement decisionmaking; 24 in the
next Part, we consider whether a lawyer's assumption of these roles is
likely to promote efficient litigation settlement decisionmaking.1 s
To assess the extent to which lawyers can help their clients avoid
being influenced by cognitive or social-psychological phenomena when
choosing between litigation options, we designed a second set of laboratory
experiments: the "Lawyer Influence" experiments. In these experiments,
all subjects played the role of litigants. We randomly selected 149 subjects
from the same pool of Stanford University undergraduate students from
which we recruited litigant subjects for the original series of
experiments. 26 Each subject received the BMW Driver version of the
Automobile Accident scenario and the Broken Promise version of the
Broken Heater scenario, each with one modification. At the end of each
scenario, the subject received one of four additional pieces of information
reputedly provided by the subject's "lawyer." These additional pieces of
information represent four techniques lawyers might actually employ to
reduce the influence that the cognitive and social-psychological factors had
on the original group of subjects."7 We reached conclusions regarding
the efficacy of these techniques by comparing the responses of the original
experimental subjects to the responses of the Lawyer Influence subjects
who received the same base scenarios along with an additional piece of
information.
power to act as "gatekeepers"-that is, to prevent clients from pursuing undesirable ends by
withholding their cooperation).
124. For an example of earlier experimental work on the efficacy of the attorney in affecting the
outcome of settlement discussions, see Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 16, at
160-64 (describing some initial experiments designed to evaluate such ability).
125. We assume for the sake of argument that lawyers will choose a counseling approach in an
effort to serve the client's interests, rather than their own. Not all commentators are willing to make
.this assumption. See, e.g., Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary
System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 12 (1992) (remarking that some proponents of settlement believe lawyers
intentionally misadvise their clients in an effort to pad their fees or further their ideological agendas).
126. Subjects were screened to ensure that none of the 149 participants in the Lawyer Influence
experiments had participated in any of the original series of experiments.
127. To avoid the possibility that the relative effectiveness of one instruction could be due to the
instruction in the other scenario with which it was paired, the four versions of the Automobile Accident
and the four versions of the Broken Heater scenario were distributed to ensure each of the sixteen
possible combinations of two scenarios appeared an equal number of times.
[Vol. 76:77
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A. The Lawyer as Educator
In the first two Lawyer Influence experiments, the lawyer functions
as an educator, attempting to alert clients to psychological processes that
might influence behavior. The lawyer does this without imposing her own
opinions as to what decision the client should make or how she should
make it.
1. The Psychology Lesson.-The most direct way for a lawyer to
educate a client about psychological factors that might affect litigation
decisionmaking without imposing her own value judgments is simply to
explain the way psychological factors have been found to operate in other
contexts. This almost purely informational teaching strategy amounts to a
version of "here's an interesting psychological phenomenon that sometimes
operates in situations like this one." The lawyer shares social science
findings with the client (about which the client is probably unaware) prior
to client decisionmaking but leaves the conclusions to be drawn from that
information, if any, to the client's discretion. Although explaining a
psychological effect might carry with it the subtle message that the lawyer
disapproves of the result to which it leads, the lawyer's bias is no more
evident in this approach than when a lawyer provides any piece of infor-
mation to a client that might be relevant in making any decision."
In the context of the Automobile Accident scenario, we tested this
"Psychology Lesson" strategy by providing BMW Driver subjects with the
following piece of information immediately after they learned of the
defendant's $21,000 settlement offer and immediately before they were
asked whether they would accept or reject the offer:
Your attorney has made it clear that "it is up to you to decide
whether to accept or reject the settlement offer." However, your
attorney has advised you to be aware of a psychological tendency
128. William Simon illustrated this point anecdotally: Two lawyer friends were representing a
woman unjustly accused of leaving the scene of an automobile accident. When it came time to consider
a prosecution plea offer that would have her enter a plea of no contest and avoid jail time, the lawyers
separately explained the ramifications of the settlement and trial options to the client, carefully avoiding
a recommendation of either course of action. See William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client
Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REv. 213, 214-16 (1991). The first lawyer ended his
explanation with the observation that, if the client accepted the plea offer, "there probably wouldn't be
any bad practical consequences, but it wouldn't be total justice," at which time the plaintiff advised him
that she would reject the plea. See id. at 215, 215-16. The second lawyer then went over the same
considerations with the plaintiff but did not offer the "it wouldn't be total justice" observation, at which
time the plaintiff advised him that she would accept the plea. See id. at 216. Simon concluded that
"[e]ven where they think of themselves as merely providing information for clients to integrate into
their own decisions, lawyers influence clients by myriad judgments, conscious or not, about what
information to present, how to order it, what to emphasize, and what style and phrasing to adopt." Id.
at 217.
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  115 1997-1998
Texas Law Review
that many people exhibit when making settlement decisions. When
choosing between options that appear to represent a financial loss,
people are much more likely to gamble than they are in other
circumstances.
Thus, when asked to choose between a sure loss of $500 or a
fifty percent chance of losing $1000, most people choose the fifty
percent chance, even though the value of each option ($500 and 50%
x $1000) is the same. This decision may produce good results (half
of the people who choose the riskier option will not lose anything)
or bad results (half of the people who choose the riskier option will
lose $1000). Regardless, your attorney has advised you to be
cognizant of this risk-taking tendency.
In the Broken Heater scenario, the Broken Promise litigants received
the following piece of information, also immediately after the defendant
made the settlement offer and immediately before the answer choices were
posed:
Your attorney has made it clear that "it is up to you to decide
whether to accept or reject the settlement offer." However, your
attorney has advised you to be aware of a psychological tendency
that many people exhibit in making settlement decisions. When
people perceive the other side as blameworthy, they often allow their
desire for vindication to influence their assessment of the offer. This
may produce good or bad results. Regardless, your attorney has
advised you to be cognizant of this equity-seeking tendency.
2. Consider the Opposite.-Psychologists have hypothesized that
judgmental errors can result when people consider only one side of a
problem. 9 This hypothesis suggests that decisions can be affected by
convincing the decisionmaker to "Consider the Opposite"-that is, to view
the problem from alternative and, if possible, opposing perspectives.Y"0
The Consider the Opposite strategy is less directly educational than the
Psychology Lesson approach, but it is similarly value-neutral.
129. For example, one group of psychologists stated:
We believe that there are also more specific and more cognitive elements involved
in this characteristic failure to consider the opposite and that these processes may underlie
many attributional and judgmental errors. In particular, we would argue, people typically
seem oblivious to the fact that the way they process information may itself influence their
judgments and that the questions they ask may determine the answers they receive. Thus
any inducement for decision makers to consider that matters might be other than what they
seem, especially an inducement to consider possibilities diametrically opposed to one's
assumptions, would have an ameliorative effect on judgmental bias.
Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1231-32 (1984) (emphasis in original).
130. Id.
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In our attempt to test the efficacy of a Consider the Opposite
approach, we provided our BMW Driver subjects with the following
admonition after they received the settlement offer, but before they were
asked to select one of the answer choices:
Your attorney has made it clear that "it is up to you to decide
whether to accept or reject the settlement offer." However, your
attorney has advised you to think carefully about your decision,
pointing out both the negative and positive aspects of the settlement
offer. Your attorney has acknowledged that the settlement offer is
$7000 less than you hoped to recover. However, your attorney has
also taken note of the fact that the settlement offer will leave you
better off than you are right now and will enable you to avoid a trial,
where the results are uncertain.
Similarly, the Broken Promise subjects in the Broken Heater scenario
were urged not to lose sight of the monetary aspect of the litigation in
pursuit of the legal system's validation of their claim:
Your attorney has made it clear that "it is up to you to decide
whether to accept or reject the settlement offer." However, your
attorney has advised you to think carefully about your decision,
pointing out both the negative and positive aspects of the settlement
offer. Your attorney has acknowledged that accepting this settlement
offer might not be as satisfying as a potential small claims court
judgment against the landlord. However, your attorney has also
taken note of the fact that accepting the settlement offer will enable
you to recover damages and avoid a potential small claims court
judgment in favor of the landlord.
B. The Lawyer as Decisionmaker
In the third and fourth versions of the Lawyer Influence experiments,
the lawyer replaces his educator hat with his advisor hat. That is, the
lawyer moves from merely providing information to affirmatively using the
client's perception of him as experienced, knowledgeable, and wise to
persuade the client to adopt the lawyer's method of evaluating the decision
options.' In both of these versions, the lawyer explicitly recommends
that the client accept the proposed settlement offer.
131. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:
A CLIENT-CENTEREDAPPROACH 186 (1977) (noting that "the client may be unduly influenced by what
the lawyer, the 'authority figure,' would do"); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 15 (1993)
(describing the "lawyer-statesman" as one "distinguished by the exceptional wisdom he displays" and
noting that "others look to him for leadership on account of his extraordinary deliberative power").
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1. Recommendation with Expected Value Explanation.-In our third
Lawyer Influence experiment, the lawyer recommends settlement and
briefly explains the reasoning that leads to that recommendation. The
reasoning is based on information presented in the Consider the Opposite
approach manipulation, but here the information is presented with the intent
to persuade the client to settle. Following the description of the settlement
offer, the BMW Driver subjects in the Automobile Accident learn:
Your attorney has advised you that "it is up to you to decide
whether to accept or reject the settlement offer." However, he has
recommended that you accept the offer for the following reason:
since a trial would give you about a fifty percent chance of
recovering $10,000 and about a fifty percent chance of recovering
$28,000, the expected value of going to trial is approximately
$19,000-$4000 less than the settlement offer.
Similarly, the Broken Promise subjects in the Broken Heater scenario
learn:
Your attorney has advised you that "it is up to you to decide
whether to accept or reject the settlement offer." However, your
attorney recommends that you accept the offer for the following
reason: if the landlord had a good excuse for being unable to fix the
heater, $900 would probably seem like a fair offer given your
inconvenience. If you think this is true, then it makes sense to
accept the $900 even though the landlord does not seem to have a
very good excuse because whether the landlord is a good or bad
person is irrelevant to the fact that he owes you a partial refund for
failing to provide heat.
2. Lawyer Recommendation. -The fourth Lawyer Influence
experiment-which most clearly represents the view that the lawyer is a
professional to whom the client should defer-simply informs the client that
the lawyer recommends settlement. The lawyer does not explain how or
why he reached this conclusion or why the client should agree with his
assessment; rather, this manipulation implicitly suggests that the client
should substitute his attorney's judgment for his own. Subjects responding
to both the Automobile Accident and the Broken Heater scenarios received
the same brief statement following the relevant settlement offer:
Your attorney has made it clear that "it is up to you to decide
whether to accept or reject the settlement offer." However, your
attorney has recommended that you accept the offer.
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C. Experimental Results
The four Lawyer Influence manipulations of the Broken Heater
scenario increased the propensity of litigant subjects to favor settlement.
While the original Broken Promise litigants in the Broken Heater
experiment said, on average, that they would reject the landlord's $900
settlement offer (providing a mean score of 2.60),32 the lawyer's efforts
to educate, advise, or both caused subjects, on average, to favor
settlement. 133  Psychology Lesson subjects scored 3.44, Consider the
Opposite subjects 3.14, Recommendation with Expected Value Explanation
subjects 3.39, and Lawyer Recommendation subjects 3.66. The responses
of the four groups were significantly different from the original group."
Figure 4-The Broken Heater






* Original Broken Promise
D Psychology Lesson
F Consider the Opposite
Recommendation with Expected Value Explanation
Lawyer Recommendation
A drastic reduction in the number of subjects who said they would
"definitely reject" the settlement offer largely explains these results.
Thirty percent of subjects in the original group said they would definitely
reject the offer, but no more than nine percent of those in the four Lawyer
Influence groups were so disposed. Thus, although none of the four
manipulations caused subjects to rush to accept the settlement offer,
opposition to settlement was far less pronounced. Among the groups, the
most notable finding is that all four strategies produced remarkably similar
132. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
133. See infra Figure 4.
134. Adding a lawyer's statement significantly affected responses: F (4, 201) = 4.68, p < .01.
Follow up t-tests demonstrate that each of the four manipulations led to responses significantly different
than the baseline version of the Broken Heater: Psychology Lesson: t (90) = 3.13, p < .01; Consider
the Opposite: t (75) = 1.81, p < .05; Recommendation with Expected Value Explanation: t (81) =
2.84, p < .01; and Lawyer Recommendation: t (82) = 3.88, p < .01.
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results. Lawyer Recommendation group subjects were the most likely to
accept the settlement offer, but they were not significantly more likely to
accept than subjects who responded to the other three manipulations.
Not only'did all four lawyer instructions produce responses that were
significantly different from the original group's responses, subjects in the
Broken Promise manipulation groups were as likely to accept the landlord's
settlement offer as the original Family Emergency subjects. The original
Family Emergency subjects provided a mean score of 3.41, 35 statistically
indistinguishable from the mean scores that subjects in the manipulation
groups provided. 36  This result suggests that lawyers may be able to
change the expressed preferences of clients who initially favor trial over
settlement due to a desire for formal vindication.
37
The power of this finding is somewhat undercut by the fact that the
Lawyer Influence manipulations did not have a similar effect on BMW
Drivers in the. Automobile Accident scenario. Although the mean res-
ponses of all four manipulation groups were somewhat higher than that of
the original group of BMW Drivers,'38 the differences were not signifi-
cant, 139 and the manipulations failed to increase the preference for
settlement among BMW Drivers to the level of the original Toyota Driver
subjects. 14o
The inconsistent results of the Lawyer Influence experiments lead us
to the tentative conclusion that, at least in some circumstances, lawyers
taking an active role in their client's litigation decisionmaking processes
probably can affect the extent to which psychological factors, as opposed
to the comparison of the expected financial values of alternative litigation
options, motivate litigants' ultimate decisions. Our results also suggest that
the effect of the reference point heuristic might be more persistent than the
impulse to seek equity. This finding in turn hints at the broader hypothesis
135. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
136. F (4, 199) = .74, p = .56.
137. The findings are remarkably robust considering that results of this type of "debiasing test"-
tests of whether reliance on heuristics will subside when subjects are provided more knowledge or
advice-are usually limited. See John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LrrERATURE
669, 671 (1996) (reviewing literature on debiasing tests).
138. Original BMW Drivers = 3.64; Psychology Lesson = 3.78; Consider the Opposite = 3.80;
Recommendation with Expected Value Explanation = 3.84; Lawyer Recommendation = 4.03.
139. F (4, 185) = .60, p = .66.
140. An ANOVA comparing the results of the four lawyer-influence manipulations of the BMW
Driver scenario with the original Toyota Driver group was significant, F (4, 183) = 2.74, p <.05, as
were individual comparisons between each manipulation and the Toyota Driver group: the difference
between original Toyota Drivers and Psychology Lesson BMW Drivers was t (65) = 2.96, p < .01;
the difference between Toyota Drivers and Consider the Opposite BMW Drivers was t (75) = 3.06,
p < .01; the difference between Toyota Drivers and Recommendation with Expected Value
Explanation BMW Drivers was t (61) = 2.46, p < .02; and the difference between the original Toyota
Drivers and the Lawyer Recommendation BMW Drivers was t (58) = 1.76, p < .09 (approaching
significance).
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that cognitive heuristics may be more deeply ingrained in people's minds
than socially-constructed desires such as the desire to be treated fairly or
to have the validity of one's position acknowledged. 4' Much more work
needs to be done, however, before we could present a theory of when a
lawyer is likely to have influence over a client's decisionmaking approach
and when she is not.
Finally, one additional point about the Lawyer Influence experiments
bears noting: in both the Automobile Accident and the Broken Heater sce-
narios, the most successful manipulation was the Lawyer Recommendation,
in which the lawyer advised settlement without providing an explanation,
although in neither case was the difference between this manipulation and
the others statistically significant. This finding (if it is not the result of
chance), seems counterintuitive: providing the client with more information
apparently reduces the likelihood of convincing a client to change his
position. We hypothesize that this might be because the Lawyer
Recommendation manipulation places the opinion of the respected lawyer-
advisor behind the settlement option without providing a justification that
some clients might find unconvincing. While a Recommendation with
Expected Value Explanation approach might, through the persuasiveness
of the explanation, convince some clients to adopt the lawyer's evaluative
technique, it might also convince some clients who would otherwise be
inclined to rely on their attorney's advice to reject that advice because they
fail to find the underlying reasoning compelling. If this explanation is
correct, our results are consistent with previous psychological research
finding that observed framing effects are remarkably persistent even after
experimental subjects have the effect explained to them. 4  This
explanation also will become important when we turn in subpart IV(C) to
the normative question of how a lawyer should counsel a client during
settlement negotiations.
IV. Considering Lawyers' Impact on Settlement Rates
A. Lawyers as Settlement Promoters
Our experimental results suggest that litigants and lawyers
systematically evaluate litigation options differently. Specifically, our
141. This appears to contradict the hypothesis of at least one research team. See Lord et al., supra
note 129, at 1232 (explaining that they chose to attempt to correct certain social-psychological biases
because they "seemed more involving than many statistical or mathematical problems.., and thus
presumably more resistant to correction").
142. See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 41, at 343 (describing an experiment in which
subjects evaluating a plan to attack a disease expressed different preferences for the same plan
depending on whether it was described in terms of lives it would save or people it would kill even after
the experimenters discussed the inconsistency of these results).
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results suggest that lawyers are more likely to explicitly or implicitly
employ expected financial value calculations when considering litigation
options, whereas litigants are more likely to deviate from this method of
analysis in a variety of circumstances. This insight suggests a new
perspective from which to analyze the lawyers' effect on settlement rates.
Most literature concerning lawyers' effect on settlement rates focuses
on what has been called the "principal-agent problem." 43 Although
lawyers are professionally obligated to consider only the interests of the
client when recommending litigation decisions," the principal-agent
literature assumes that lawyers will not always hew to this ideal but instead
will often seek personal gain when their interests conflict with those of
their clients. 45
The incentive effects of lawyers' fee arrangements is an oft-considered
issue." 6  Contingent fee arrangements, for example, might promote
higher levels of settlement because the contingency-fee lawyer can often
maximize her income by settling many cases for a percentage of the take,
rather than shepherding a smaller number of cases through the far more
time-intensive trial process. 47 The lawyer preferring a quick settlement
143. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent
Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal
and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979) (both analyzing the effect of the attorney's fee
arrangement on the alignment of interests between the attorney and the client).
144. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.7(b) (1995) ("A lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by ... the lawyer's own
interests . . . ."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (1980) (prohibiting
representation if "the exercise of his professionaljudgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably
may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests"); see also Geoffrey P.
Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 210 (1987) (noting that the
standards for professional conduct "are fully applicable in the settlement context").
145. See, e.g., Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 48 (manuscript at 8) ("Lawyers seek to
maximize their income while clients seek to obtain accurate, cost-justified information. Placed in the
language of economics, there is an agency problem inherent in the lawyer/client relationship.").
146. The fee arrangement literature is extensive. Some notable works include Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, How Would You Like to Pay for That? The Strategic Effects of Fee
Arrangements on Settlement Terms, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 53 (1996) (arguing that contingent
fee arrangements systematically work to benefit plaintiffs' strategic position in settlement negotiations);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintif"s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 676
(1986) (suggesting that contingent fee arrangements in derivative and class actions do not provide an
.excessive" incentive to litigate); Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 503 (1996) (modeling the economically optimal contingent fee arrangement assuming that fees
affect attorneys' work effort and that effort affects litigation results); Miller, supra note 144 (addressing
agency issues under a number of attorney-client fee arrangements); and Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel
J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1125, 1126 (1970) (concluding that a "contingent fee does not necessarily put the lawyer on the
client's side or automatically lead him to do what the client would desire if the client could understand
the nature of his case and the intricacies of litigation").
147. Cf. Miller, supra note 144, at 198-202 (demonstrating that under traditional contingent fee
arrangements attorneys will favor settlement at lower monetary levels than will plaintiffs); Schwartz
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to free up time for other potentially profitable opportunities may exert
pressure on her client to settle. 14" Hourly fee arrangements, by contrast,
might impede settlement because the time required to stage a trial enriches
the lawyer while the client bears the attendant financial risk. 149  This
incentive problem may be exacerbated by the legal profession's culture of
adversarialism. 15 0
Although each individual incentive story undoubtedly contains valuable
insights, the principal-agent literature as a whole fails to provide a coherent
theory about whether lawyers, on balance, promote or impede settlement.
For every plausible claim that lawyers' fee arrangements have one-
directional effect on settlement rates, there is an equally plausible claim
that lawyers' long-term financial incentives might cut in the opposite
direction. '' A lawyer's desire to build reputational capital might
outweigh his desire to maximize income in any particular case. 152  This
suggests that a contingency fee lawyer might favor trial over settlement,
rather than the reverse, if he wants to enhance his reputation as a gladiator
in order to attract future clients. 153  An hourly fee lawyer who calculates
that his reputation would be harmed more by losing a trial than it would
be enhanced by winning a trial might favor settlement after all,"M despite
his immediate financial incentive to favor trial. In short, the assumption
of the fee arrangement literature that lawyers will seek to maximize their
& Mitchell, supra note 146, at 1136-38 (suggesting that contingent fee agreements promote earlier
settlements that are less lucrative for clients so that attorneys can maximize their earnings per hour of
work).
148. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or
a Market For Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 625, 627-28 n.12, 672 n.212 (1995) (describing
litigation in which attorneys allegedly employed coercive tactics in order to obtain a quick settlement
and collect legal fees).
149. See Miller, supra note 144, at 203, 202-03 ("[A] purely rational and self-interested attorney
would never settle an hourly fee case in which he or she is working for a profit.").
150. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan,Do Lawyers CauseAdversarialLegalism?A Preliminary Inquiry,
19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 2 (1994) ("[W]hile adversarial legalism stems primarily from enduring
features of American political culture and governmental structure, the legal profession itself does play
a significant independent role in promoting and perpetuating adversarial legal contestation as a
prominent feature of governance." (emphasis in original)); Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role
of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807 (1994) (arguing that tort lawyers have
reduced doctrinal certainty and increased litigation in products liability law to benefit themselves); cf.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving,
31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 793-94 (1984) (criticizing the adversarial nature of legal negotiation).
151. See generally Gary Mendelsohn, Lawyers as Negotiators, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV.
139, 139-43 (1996) (cataloguing a variety of reasons that lawyers with different financial and
reputational incentives might promote or hinder settlement).
152. See Painter, supra note 148, at 670 (claiming that "'reputational capital' is the single largest
asset of many lawyers").
153. See JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT
INSURANCE 46 (1971).
154. See Mendelsohn, supra note 151, at 143 (speculating that successful litigators might have an
incentive to settle close cases to avoid risking a "blemish" on their litigation scorecard).
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income even when doing so is harmful to clients, even if true,55 provides
little insight into whether lawyers, as a class, promote or impede
settlement.
Our approach provides the basis for a more certain directional predic-
tion as to the impact of lawyers on settlement rates. The high monetary
costs of staging a trial 56 suggest that a decisionmaker concerned
primarily or exclusively with the financial value of litigation will favor
settlement more often than a decisionmaker affected by frames, anchors,
a desire to maintain equitable relationships, or other non-wealth-
maximizing psychological phenomena.5 7 If our experimental data cor-
rectly predict that lawyers are more likely than litigants to concern
themselves primarily with the financial value of litigation, lawyers are
likely to facilitate a higher rate of settlement than we would expect litigants
to negotiate on their own. This prediction is consistent with the extremely
high actual rate of settlement. 5 While our "cognitive" account is not
necessarily or even likely to be the sole explanation of high settlement
rates, ' 9 we believe it is a crucial piece of the puzzle of why we observe
such high rates of settlement despite the myriad ways negotiation break-
down can occur in the litigation context."6
B. Lawyers and the Efficiency of the Litigation System
Whether a higher settlement rate than would otherwise be observed
indicates that lawyers promote more efficient dispute resolution is another
question entirely, and the answer is not obvious. Like other private
agreements, settlements are generally considered efficient because they
place the contracting parties in a situation that is Pareto superior to their
155. We are more optimistic than the authors of the fee incentive literature that cultural norms of
ethical lawyering are sufficiently strong in the legal community that the lawyer who pads his wallet at
the client's expense is the exception rather than the rule. See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note
48 (manuscript at 53) ("Perhaps only a deviant segment of the bar would deliberately allow self-interest
to affect the objectivity of advice to their clients."); Michael K. McChrystal, Lawyers and Loyalty, 33
WM. & MARY L. REv. 367, 368-70 (1992) (contending that the norm of loyalty to the client is central
to lawyers' concept of their profession).
156. See supra note 1.
157. This prediction is, of course, for aggregate numbers of cases. In any individual case, a strict
expected-financial-value analysis could point toward trial, whereas sensitivity to psychological
phenomena could lead to a preference for settlement.
158. The observed correlation between our prediction and the actual data on settlements does not,
however, prove causation. But we believe it does indicate that our experimental findings lead to a very
plausible explanation of the high rate of settlement deserving of further study.
159. For example, it might also be true that clients have an incentive to select lawyers with a
reputation for cooperative behavior, and, by building and maintaining such reputations, lawyers
promote settlement. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 24, at 512-13, 522-27 (demonstrating that the
existence of cooperative attorneys allows coordinated action between disputants to solve a "prisoner's
dilemma" situation).
160. See infra notes 193-222 and accompanying text.
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prior situation. 6 t That is, if the litigating parties both voluntarily agree
to settlement terms and waive their rights to seek adjudication of their
dispute, we presume one or both litigants is better off as a result of the
transaction, and neither is worse off. 62 But if a litigant who would
otherwise choose not to settle decides to settle as a result of her lawyer's
influence, it is unclear a priori whether the settlement leaves the litigant
better off than would a decision to risk adjudication. 63
This concern appears to have led, implicitly if not explicitly, to
the position maintained by some legal ethicists that the primary goal of
client counseling is the preservation of client decisionmaking
autonomy. t  Under this "client-centered" model of counseling, 65  the
lawyer serves as an objective and unopinionated counselor. 6 According
to Binder and Price, the model's most notable proponents, the proper role
of the lawyer is entirely process-oriented. 67 The lawyer may help clients
161. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (1988) ("A particular
distribution of goods among consumers is said to be Pareto efficient if it is not impossible to
redistribute the goods so as to make at least one consumer better off (in his own estimation) without
making another consumer worse off (again, in his own estimation).").
162. See supra note 161.
163. In other words, if lawyers as a group promote more settlements than would be reached
otherwise, those marginal settlements could make at least one of the parties worse off: the party who
would otherwise have declined to settle on the specified terms. If this is true, the settlement will not
only be detrimental to that party, it will not be Pareto superior to adjudication and thus may be
inefficient.
Exchanges that are not Pareto superior can in some circumstances be efficient under the Kaldor-
Hicks test, a less stringent measure of efficiency than the Pareto test. Under the Kaldor-Hicks test, an
exchange is considered efficient if the benefitting party benefits more than the harmed party is harmed.
See POSNER, supra note 31, at 13-14 (comparing the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks tests). In a settlement
negotiation setting, though, in which transaction costs are likely to be low, the settlement payoff can
be adjusted such that any settlement that would be a Kaldor-Hicks efficient settlement can be made
acceptable to both parties and, thus, Pareto superior to trial.
164. See generally Simon, supra note 128, at 213 (describing the "influential view" that "the
lawyer's most basic function is to enhance the autonomy of the client").
165. The label is borrowed from BINDER & PRICE, supra note 131, at 19-22 (defining the
characteristics of the client-centered approach); see also DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTEREDAPPROACH (1991) (describing the client-centered approach as an
attitude of looking at problems from the client's perspective while making the client a true partner in
the resolution of her problems).
166. Some argue that it is impossible for a lawyer to present options in a truly neutral manner.
How the lawyer packages the choices will always affect the way that the client evaluates them. See
generally Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1988) ("Lawyers
who say they just provide technical input and lay out the options while leaving the decisions and
methods of implementing them up to their clients are kidding themselves .... "). The truth in this
observation, however, does not suggest that a lawyer striving for complete neutrality and objectivity
cannot come substantially closer to achieving this goal than one who seeks to persuade.
167. In the first edition of their influential work on client-centered counseling, Binder and Price
defined client counseling as "a process in which potential solutions, with their probable positive and
negative consequences, are identified and then weighed in order to decide which alternative is most
appropriate." BINDER & PRICE, supra note 131, at 135.
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reach decisions by identifying alternatives 168  and analyzing
consequences, 169 but under most circumstances he should "refrain from
announcing what [he] think[s] a client should do." 70  In fact, Binder and
Price recommended in their initial work on the subject that the lawyer
decline to offer an opinion even when asked.171
This client-centered theory, in its strongest form, seems difficult to
defend. A client generally presumes her lawyer will provide substantive
advice, rather than just procedural assistance."7 And if a lawyer in fact
168. See id. at 158-63 (describing the cooperative role of attorney and client in identifying
alternatives); BINDER Er AL., supra note 165, at 292 ("Once a client's objectives are out in the open,
the second step is to identify alternatives." (emphasis in original)); Simon, supra note 10, at 9
(describing the "crude" autonomy view as requiring the lawyer to present the client with all relevant
information, and the "refined" version of autonomy as requiring the lawyer to present information that
the typical person in the client's position would consider relevant).
169. See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 131, at 166 ("After the lawyer and client have joined their
talents to articulate the alternatives that bear consideration, the counseling dialogue can then be turned
to an analysis of the potential consequences of each alternative."). During this process, "[t]he lawyer
will both identify the consequences which he/she sees as probable and also inquire of the client what
consequences the client foresees." Id.; see also BINDER ErT AL., supra note 165, at 293-308 (detailing
the process involved in identifying consequences).
170. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 131, at 186.
171. See id. at 187. Binder and Price suggested that the lawyer respond to requests for advice by
explaining that she is not in a position to know the client's value system and by offering to facilitate
the client's decisionmaking process. They offered the following hypothetical response for illustration:
Mr. Hawkins, I'm not really in a position to evaluate the situation.... Only you know
what is most important to you, and you're the person who's going to have to live with the
decision. I can understand it's difficult to decide, but given I can't know what's most
important to you, I think you should make the decision. I'll be glad to explore the
consequences with you some more if that will help.
Id. In the second edition of their work on client-centered counseling, Binder, Bergman, and Price
adopted a more moderate view:
A radical view of the client-centered approach might lead you to reject requests for
advice in order to avoid influencing decisions. However, that view demeans clients'
ability to make independent judgments; deprives clients of the opportunity to get advice
from a person who has professional expertise and emotional distance from a problem; and
may well defeat the expectations of most clients. We therefore reject such a radical
position.
However, though you may ultimately provide a client who asks for it with your
opinion, you should do so only after you have counseled a client thoroughly enough that
you can base your opinion on the client's subjective values, not your own.
BINDER E" AL., supra note 165, at 279.
172. See, e.g., BINDER & PRICE, supra note 131, at 197 (noting that some clients "insist upon the
lawyer's opinion .... In their view, a proper lawyer-client relationship is one where the client is
passive and the lawyer tells the client what the lawyer thinks is best."); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as
Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1088 (1976) ("[I]n
very many situations a lawyer will be advising a client who wants to effectuate his purposes within the
law, to be sure, but who also wants to behave as a decent, moral person. It would be absurd to
contend that the lawyer must abstain from giving advice . . . ."); Rutledge R. Liles, Lawyers as
Counselors: The Conflict Between Ordinary Morality and Practical Reality, 42 FLA. L. REv. 479, 479
(1990) ("Lawyers, by virtue of their education, practical experience, and position in society, attract
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knows what is best for the client, it is difficult to defend the morality,
much less the efficacy, of the lawyer's failure to provide direct advice. 73
But the Binder and Price dedication to autonomy 74 seems less ideological
than pragmatic. While Binder and Price believe litigation decisions
ultimately should be consistent with the values of the client, thus
demonstrating some ambivalence about the primacy of client autonomy,
they hypothesize that the lawyer is usually not in a position to fully
understand those values, and they fear that he, therefore, might influence
a client to make a decision inconsistent with her values.
Other ethical theorists are less wedded to client autonomy than
Binder and Price. 75 They believe the lawyer can play a more active
role in settlement decisionmaking. To proponents of this paternalistic
view, 176 the lawyer sometimes knows what is better for the client
than the client does herself,'" and thus the lawyer intervenes in client
people who seek advice on a multiplicity of problems. Although a lawyer's counseling efforts generally
are focused on legal issues, clients frequently seek legal advice on business and personal matters.").
173. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1267-68
(1995) (noting that "[a]vailable evidence indicates certain irrationalities in people's determinations of
a fair bargain" but that a lawyer negotiating a settlement "can moderate these irrational predispositions
by undertaking persuasion of his client based on his more extensive experience"); see also Stephen
Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 717, 767 (1987) ("It seems fair to say that a lawyer
who avoids giving advice to a client capable of assessing it is acting with disrespect towards her client
by failing to treat him as a competent person.").
174. At least one scholar has questioned whether the original Binder and Price client-centered
counseling model is really dedicated to client autonomy. See Ellmann, supra note 173, at 744-46.
Ellmann argued that the client-centered model is manipulative because it dictates the very
decisionmaking process that the lawyer and client pursue. The lawyer decides, for example, what steps
the two of them will take together, in what order they will be taken, and who will ultimately decide
what to do. See id. at 745-46.
175. See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA. L. REV.
439, 447 (1990) ("I do not like the concept of 'autonomy.'... None of us should see ourselves as
truly autonomous. We were born into families and nurtured by communities. As a result, we owe
obligations to those individuals and groups, as well as to the broader society.").
176. See Simon, supra note 128, at 213, 223-24 (contrasting the autonomy view of lawyering to
the opposing, paternalist view).
177. See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 173, at 764 ("A more familiar rationale for attorneys'
manipulation of their clients is that a lawyer has a duty to protect the client's best interests even if the
client does not perceive them."); David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L.
REV. 454, 491 (arguing that attorneys may sometimes be able to assess when their clients' "wants" are
inconsistent with their "values" better than clients can); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal
Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 488, 486 (1984) (noting that his vision of lawyering acknowledges
"that people might have interests of which they are not aware" and that "[t]he precept that the lawyer
further the client's interests, as she understands them, is qualified by the precept that she also try to
enhance the client's capacity to express her own interests"); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 17 (1975) ("[I]t is the received wisdom within
the professions that the client lacks the perspective necessary to pursue in a satisfactory way his or her
own best interests, and that the client requires a detached, disinterested representative to look after his
or her interests.").
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decisionmaking to help a client accomplish what she really, albeit
unknowingly, values.
Luban, for instance, argued that lawyers should exercise what he
called "Interests Over Wants" paternalism in client counseling 78 He
placed litigants' possible litigation goals into three categories: "interests,"
"values," and "wants. "179 Interests are those items that serve as
"generalized means to any ultimate ends," like freedom or money, that are
useful to anyone."8 Wants constitute desires. Values "are those reasons
[for acting] with which the agent most closely identifies-those that form
the core of his personality, that make him who he is."' Under Luban's
conception of ethical lawyering, the lawyer may not intrude on client
decisionmaking autonomy when the client pursues interests consistent with
his values. But when the client pursues interests consistent with his wants
but inconsistent with his values, the lawyer may intervene."n Another
way of stating this principle is that a lawyer has more counseling latitude
when a client's expressed desire does not faithfully reflect her settled
preferences. 83  The rules of legal ethics incorporate shades of this
conception of lawyering by allocating the power to make decisions about
litigation tactics to lawyers rather than clients4--a rule that can be
understood as codifying the belief that a client's expressed desires about
litigation tactics are not the type of wants capable of reflecting values and
could, in fact, conflict with client values.
Other legal ethicists view the lawyer-client relationship as a limited
friendship." According to this conception, no person is completely
autonomous,'86 and candid advice is more beneficial than destructive to
the service of the client's values."s Kronman's conception of the lawyer
takes this analogy a step further. Kronman referred to his ideal attorney
as a "lawyer-statesman": a wise sage whose advice is valued because her
178. Luban, supra note 177, at 472, 472-74 (defining Interest Over Wants paternalism as
.constraining, in another's own best interest, his liberty to do what he wants").
179. Id. at 467-72.
180. Id. at 471.
181. Id. at 470.
182. See id. at 474.
183. Cf. Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 3, 7 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983)
(distinguishing between "fully voluntary" assumptions of risk-in which the action is a result of
"deliberate choice" made with time, information, a clear head, and rational faculties-and "not fully
voluntary" assumptions of risk).
184. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.2 cmt. 1 (1995) ("In questions of
means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for... legal tactical issues.. . ."); see also MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980) ("In certain areas of legal representation not
affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled
to make decisions on his own.").
185. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 172, at 1065-67; Morgan, supra note 175, at 455-59.
186. See Morgan, supra note 175.
187. See id. at 457-59.
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character and experience make her uniquely qualified to help others better
understand their own ideals and values. 8  The underlying premise of
this conception is that the lawyer has the capacity to understand what
course of action is best for the client 89 and thus possesses the ability to
serve the client well by following a course of action that consists of more
than merely carrying out direct orders."9  Elements of the friend and
lawyer-statesman approaches to lawyering also appear in the ethical rules
governing the practice of law. For example, the Model Rules require the
lawyer to "exercise independent professional judgment and render candid
advice.' 9' The rules also instruct the lawyer to consider "moral,
economic, social and political factors" when rendering that advice.'
92
These paternalistic models of lawyering are based on the belief that,
at least in some circumstances, the lawyer can create value for his client
by intervening in the client's process of evaluating litigation options.
This belief, though, is not strictly inconsistent with Binder and Price's fear
that lawyer intervention can have just the opposite effect. The question
that theories rooted in paternalism and autonomy both beg is this: When
are a litigant's stated desires concerning litigation options inconsistent
with her settled values and preferences? Both types of theories assume that
lawyers cannot know the answer, and thus they ignore the question.
Our experimental results cast light on how difficult a question this is, but
also illuminate a theoretically sound, although practically complex,
approach lawyers should take to counseling clients concerning litigation
options.
C. The Cognitive Error Approach to Lawyering
1. The Importance of the Means-Ends Distinction. -The critical
question raised by our experimental results is whether lawyers and
clients evaluate litigation options differently because they seek different
ends or because they use different means in an effort to attain the
same ends. If the latter is the case, lawyers may assume that clients
fall prey to computational or representational errors93 that a lawyer
188. KRONMAN, supra note 131, at 14-17 (describing the leadership and character of the lawyer-
statesman ideal). Elihu Root is often cited for the observation that "[a]bout half of the practice of a
decent lawyer is telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop." Gilson, supra
note 123, at 884.
189. See Simon, supra note 128, at 224, 222-26 ("The paternalist view is intensely individualistic
to the extent that it aspires to deep knowledge of the client as a concrete individual and grounds the
lawyer's decision in the client's self-realization.").
190. See Fried, supra note 172, at 1071 (describing the lawyer as a limited-purpose friend because
"he acts in your interests, not his own; or rather he adopts your interests as his own").
191. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1995).
192. Id.
193. See Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 146 (claiming that "framing poses a representational, rather
than a computational problem").
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  129 1997-1998
Texas Law Review [Vol. 76:77
can remedy, leading to settlement decisions that better serve the clients'
interests; a if the former is the case, lawyers should recognize that
their influence on clients' decisionmaking could lead to settlements
that do not maximize client utility"5 and are thus inefficient, at least
under a Pareto standard. 1
9 6
We think it nearly self-evident that a lawyer who knows his client is
embarking on a course with a lower expected utility than an alternative
course has an ethical obligation to take preventive action."' On the other
hand, when the client's expressed litigation desires maximize his expected
utility, the lawyer should avoid any action that might convince the client
to abandon his position. In other words, the lawyer should avoid substi-
tuting her utility function for her client's.
The cognitive error approach to counseling, then, requires the lawyer
to assess whether an observed difference between the lawyer's and client's
analysis of decision options is due to the client's cognitive error or is
merely the manifestation of differences in utility functions. If the
difference is due to cognitive error, the lawyer should attempt to change
the client's outlook. If the difference is the result of different preference
structures, the lawyer should scrupulously avoid any interference. 9
194. Selecting among alternative means to a given end is, at root, an exercise in the counting of
costs, and it is possible to say some are "better" at making such calculations than others without
instigating a debate over subjective values that underlie disagreements concerning ends. See KRONMAN,
supra note 131, at 63, 54-56 ("To the extent that a personal choice presents a question of means and
nothing more, it can be settled by calculation, and the person who deliberates ably about such questions
will simply be the one who calculates well.").
195. Law and economics scholars assume that rational people will attempt to maximize their
expected utility. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents:
Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1785, 1813 (1995) (calling the utility-
maximizing assumption "a standard heuristic in economic analysis"); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211, 213 (1995) ("According to the
standard economic model of choice, an actor who must make a choice in the face of uncertainty will
rationally select the option that maximizes his subjective expected utility." (citation omitted)); Robert
C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and
Economics, 65 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989) (explaining that the pure law and economics model
.assumes that an actor will choose the course of action that will maximize his personal expected
utility"); see also, e.g., John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950)
(applying the utility-maximizing assumption to a classical bargaining problem).
196. For a discussion of an alternate standard of efficiency, see supra note 163.
197. Cf. KRONMAN, supra note 131, at 129 ("[W]hen surrounding circumstancessuggest a client's
decision is impetuous, a responsible lawyer will test his client's judgment before accepting it,
recognizing that in such situations the danger of regret is large and that a lawyer must protect his client
from this familiar species of self-inflicted harm ... ."); Bundy, supra note 125, at 23 (arguing that
when the lawyer can identify with confidence that a client has made an irrational decision-one not
based on her "preferences and values"-the lawyer should intervene and attempt to correct the error).
198. Cf. Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV.
527, 533-34 (1994) (posing the questions: "[u]nder what circumstances should a lawyer offer the client
her own advice ... or urge a client to pursue or refrain from pursuing a particular course of action?"
and "[a]re lawyers-by virtue of training, experience, or professional distance-sometimes better
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Although the prescription is clear in theory, the following analysis of our
experimental scenarios makes it clear that lawyers may find it quite
difficult to make such judgments in individual cases.
2. Evaluating the Demonstrated Lawyer-Client Differences.-Neale
and Bazerman contended that "individuals deviate from rationality" when
they are affected by the reference point heuristic." This characterization
is descriptively accurate, at least as "rationality" is usually defined.2'
Individuals relying on reference points violate the invariance principle, the
basic tenet of rationality that posits that individuals should make the same
choice between two options no matter how the two options are
presented." But Neale and Bazerman's critique is normative as well as
descriptive. They wrote to alert negotiators that the world is made up of
"imperfectly rational actors"M and to help those negotiators avoid
becoming one of that group's number.
Under the Neale and Bazerman view of decisionmaking in
negotiation-the conventional view-some of the BMW Drivers in our
Automobile Accident scenario erred by permitting the value of the lost
vehicle to affect their comparison of the two options before them.
Implicitly, Neale and Bazerman concluded that behavior that falls beyond
the bounds of the traditional postulates of rationality, such as this, signifies
the failure of individuals to maximize their utility.
If our BMW Driver subjects maximize utility by maximizing wealth,
this characterization is accurate.2 3 In the language of an accountant, the
BMW Drivers faced a thinly veiled "sunk-cost" problem.2°4  The value
of the subject's destroyed automobile is a sunk cost: it is nonrecoverable
and does not affect the expected value calculation of either decision choice.
An accountant would no doubt advise the client that the BMW's value is
decisionmakers than their clients, and what implications does this have for the client-centered model
[of counseling]?").
199. NEALE & BAZERMAN, supra note 41, at 41. In a chapter entitled "Individual Biases in
Negotiations," Neale and Bazerman discussed the "framing" and "anchoring" effects that we have
tested under the rubric of reference point heuristics as well as research on problems of "availability"
and "overconfidence." Id. at 43; see also Bundy, supra note 125, at 16 (observing that many litigants
may miscalculate outcomes or "rely on simplifying information-processing heuristics" that can result -
in erroneous choices because they deviate from rationality).
200. See supra note 4; see also Eisenberg, supra note 195, at 218 ("[A] basic assumption of
expected-utility theory, sometimes called invariance, is that a decisionmaker's preference between two
options should not depend on how a choice is characterized and presented, or 'framed.'").
201. See PLOUS, supra note 4, at 82 (defining the invariance principle).
202. NEALE & BAZERMAN, supra note 41, at 59.
203. Cf. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 48 (manuscript at 58) (claiming that "rational
client[s] seeking legal advice about a proposed course of action" should ask for a probability calculation
and then make a "straightforward calculation of the expected utility").
204. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 95 (3d
ed. 1988) ("Sunk costs are like spilt milk: they are past and irreversible outflows.").
1997]
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irrelevant to the settlement-versus-trial decision.25  So would most
economists.' From this perspective, a subject's decision to settle or
demand adjudication should not depend on the car destroyed in the
accident. That Toyota Drivers were more likely than BMW Drivers to
accept the settlement offer suggests that some BMW Drivers based their
decisions on sunk-cost considerations, and, therefore, some of those
subjects rejected a favorable offer. This result does not necessarily mean
that our subjects are poor decisionmakers, in a general sense. Reliance on
a reference point heuristic might enable people to make utility-maximizing
decisions in most cases while simultaneously minimizing the time and
resource costs of decisionmaking.7' But the apparent cost of using this
heuristic in litigation decisionmaking is that it can lead to individual
decisions that fail to maximize the utility of the litigant-decisions that,
therefore, can be classified normatively as "mistakes." If the conclusion
that follows from this experiment is that a statistically significant
percentage of the BMW Driver subjects made mistakes, it must also be true
that the lawyer subjects representing BMW Drivers did not make
mistakes.2 °8 Put slightly differently, the lawyer subjects, compared to the
nonlawyer subjects, were less likely to suffer the cost of relying
excessively on the reference point heuristic.
By focusing on the settlement-versus-trial decision solely from a
financial perspective, however, this approach is too narrow. While it is
undoubtedly true that some litigants in the Automobile Accident scenario
violated the invariance principle, they might have actually maximized their
205. Cf. NEALE & BAZERMAN, supra note 41, at 79 (noting that accounting instructors teach
students that it is rational to ignore sunk costs but that students commonly make the mistake anyway);
Conlisk, supra note 137, at 671-72 (noting that professors teach economic reasoning and provide grades
as an incentive for "getting the right answers" but still "use gallons of red ink to inform students that
they [did] not").
206. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 31, at 8 ("Rational people base their decisions on their
expectations of the future rather than on their regrets about the past. They treat bygones as bygones.");
William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7, 37 (1988) ("One of the earliest lessons in economics is that decisions should be based
on incremental benefits and costs .... [Hiowever, [this rule] must compete with an alternative
intuition: the larger the past resource investment in a decision, the greater the inclination to continue
the commitment in subsequent decisions."); Thaler, supra note 47, at 98 ("Historical or sunk costs
should be irrelevant.").
207. See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases
for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1115, 1139-40 (1987) ("Experiments have shown that
as intuitive statisticians, we do not naturally use precise tools like multiple regression or Bayes'
theorem, but instead we cope by using a limited number of rules of thumb called heuristics .... Often
these heuristics prove quite useful."); Conlisk, supra note 137, at 671 ("[H]euristics often provide an
adequate solution cheaply whereas more elaborate approaches would be unduly expensive." (footnote
omitted)); Warren Thorngate, Efficient Decision Heuristics, 25 BEHAV. Sc. 219, 223 (1980) ("[A]
wide variety of 'decision heuristics will usually produce optimal, or close to optimal, choices and can
thus be termed relatively efficient.").
208. See supra section II(A)(1).
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utility by choosing trial rather than settlement. In such a case, it is
meaningless to point out that these subjects violated formal principles of
rationality.2' In fact, it is probably more helpful to think of two types
of rationality-"objective" rationality, which demands that decisionmakers
follow certain principles of logic (including the invariance principle), and
"subjective" rationality, which demands that decisionmakers know their
goals and pursue them in a way reasonably likely to lead to success2 -
and to affirm the subjective rationality of such subjects while conceding
that they violate principles of objective rationality.
Individuals derive utility from a broad range of sources,21' and their
preferences often may be situationally dependent rather than absolute.
2 12
In the Automobile Accident scenario, for instance, some BMW Drivers
might have had a strong desire for maintaining the status quo in their
lives.213  The possibility of recovering enough money at trial to maintain
a pre-accident level of consumption could conceivably be important enough
to a BMW-driving litigant that he would maximize expected utility-
although not expected dollar income-by engaging in risky behavior.214
Other subjects might have sought to satisfy a taste for status rather than a
209. See JONATHAN ST. B.T. EVANS & DAVID E. OVER, RATIONALITY AND REASONING 8 (1996)
("It is foolish in itself to assume that someone who violates some normative principle does not know
what he is doing nor how to achieve the goal he has in mind.").
210. See id. at 7-10. In describing the two types of rationality, Evans and Over also referred to
what we have labeled objective rationality as "impersonal" rationality and what we have labeled
subjective rationality as "personal" rationality. Id. at 6; see also JOHN R. ANDERSON, THE ADAPTIVE
CHARACTER OF THOUGHT 28 (1990) (distinguishing between "logically correct reasoning" and
reasoning that is "optimal in terms of achieving human goals"). Evans and Over contended that a
major problem with the large body of experimental research on reasoning is that experimenters often
assume rationality is limited to the objective or impersonal form of rationality. See EVANS & OVER,
supra note 209, at 8.
211. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 161, at 23 ("It is important to remember that the [utility]
preferences of the consumer are purely subjective. That is, they are his or her preferences, to be
discovered by finding out what he or she likes, not by telling him or her what to like." (emphasis in
original)).
212. See Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & SOC.
INQ. 487, 512 (1994) ("[A]n individual's behavior may vary according to the context in which the
procedures under which choice is made or judgment exercised, even though the substance of the
particular decision to be made appears identical to that involved in another choice or judgment situation
confronted by the same individual.").
213. There is a substantial literature describing the so-called "status quo bias." See, e.g.,
RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 68
(1992) ("[I]ndividuals have a strong tendency to remain at the status quo, because the disadvantages
of leaving it loom larger than the advantages."); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness
to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993)
(surveying the experimental literature on the status quo bias); see also Korobkin, supra note 77, at 663-
708 (describing the challenge to conceptions of efficiency caused by the status quo bias and suggesting
alternative ways for law and economics to respond to the challenge).
214. See THALER, supra note 213, at 74-75 (noting that in many situations, "[floregone gains are
less painful than perceived losses").
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taste for transportation. 15 BMW Drivers with such an outlook could
have viewed trial as providing a fifty percent chance at maintaining a
"BMW" level of status, whereas settlement, because it would leave them
unable to replace the lost automobile, would result in a loss of status that
would leave them no worse off (or only marginally worse off) than would
an adverse trial verdict.
Given these possible explanations of their decisions, we cannot state
with certainty that BMW Drivers who opted for trial made decisions that
failed to maximize their expected utility,"6 although such a conclusion
is certainly one possibility. Thus, a lawyer representing a BMW Driver
must recognize that his client's reluctance to accept the $21,000 settlement
offer could be either a cognitive error (if the client seeks to maximize
wealth) or a utility-maximizing choice (if the client prefers maintaining the
status quo or maximizing status over maximizing dollar income)." 7
The possibility that our litigant subjects behaved in a utility-
maximizing way-though not a wealth-maximizing way-is even more
apparent in the Broken Heater scenario, where the lawyer represents the
client who wishes to reject the $900 settlement offer made by the landlord
who has no excuse for his bad behavior. This lawyer should ask whether
there is reason to believe that choosing adjudication over settlement is
antithetical to the maximization of the client's utility. Although a desire
for a sense of equity or fairness in interpersonal relationships-which
appears to have influenced some Broken Promise subjects in the Broken
Heater scenario l-may not result in wealth-maximizing behavior in this
case, it seems quite consistent with a fairly common preference
215. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 47-48 (1992) ("TIhe data
... suggest[] that the desire for social distinction is powerful."). McAdams argued that changes in
income that will affect observable consumption loom larger than changes that will not affect relative
social and economic status. "Therefore, people appear to prefer risk when they can take observable
losses for a chance at observable gains, but to avoid risk when they can forgo unobservable gains to
hedge against unobservable losses. In the former case they would gamble; in the latter, insure." Id.
at 47. Put more generally, the level of status an amount of dollars can buy is often more important to
people than the dollars themselves. Because dollars and status do not have a linear relationship, we
can predict that some increments of income will have a relatively low marginal utility, while other
increments will have a very high marginal utility.
216. The BMW Driver with such a preference structure could, of course, accept the settlement
offer and use it to place a wager that, if successful, would return enough money to pay for a new
BMW. This would seem to be the rational option, though, only if the transaction costs associated with
making such a gamble were relatively low, and the subject's taste for maintaining the status quo were
satisfied as well by replacing the car with gambling winnings as by forcing the adversary to pay to
replace the car.
217. Cf. Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 41, at 343 (arguing that it is not necessarily
"wrong to be risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. ... These
preferences conform to compelling intuitions about the subjective value of gains and losses, and the
presumption is that people should be entitled to their own values").
218. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
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structure.19 In this situation, the lawyer who attempts to influence the
client clearly risks talking the client out of a "good" (utility-maximizing)
decision without clear evidence that the intervention will help the client
avoid a "bad" decision.'
By contrast, the responses of the litigant subjects in the Lemon
scenario-in which subjects were more likely to accept a final settlement
offer if their expectations were anchored by a very low initial offer3-
seem less likely to be utility maximizing. It is conceivable that the subjects
who received the low initial offer derived more utility from the final offer
because they wrested a "bigger" concession out of the opposition. Such
an explanation, though, seems strained. It is both obvious and meaningless
to say the members of the $2000 initial offer group felt "better" about the
final settlement offer than their counterparts who received the $10,000
initial offer. It seems far more likely that members of the latter group
expressed a greater preference for trial because their attempts to make the
utility-maximizing choice were impaired by their cognitive limitations"m
than that they possessed an overwhelming desire to vanquish the opposition
or that they derived significantly less utility from a smaller concession than
the other subjects did from a larger concession.
3. Normative Implications.-Although everyone's decisions are
affected by psychological phenomena and aided by heuristics, lawyers are
likely to be more inclined than their clients to adhere to the principles of
expected financial value analysis. When a lawyer recognizes that a client's
expressed litigation preference is inconsistent not only with expected
219. Compare THALER, supra note 213, at 22-24 (describing the results of "ultimatum game"
experiments in which two subjects divide a sum of money, with one subject having the power to
determine the allocation and the other subject the power to either accept or reject, with a rejection
causing both subjects to forfeit any share; and concluding that the most commonly observed offer of
a 50/50 split is inconsistent with rational choice theory), with Ulen, supra note 212, at 498 (contending
that the results cited by Thaler are not inconsistent with rationality: "All one needs to assume is that
... the players have nonmonetary elements in their utility functions."); see also Bundy, supra note
125, at 24-25 (arguing that it is difficult for observers to determine whether litigiousness is caused by
'self-destructive" impulses or rational calculation because preference disorders or calculation failures
may resemble a "normal sense ofjustice or righteous indignation").
220. Cf. Nelken, supra note 52, at 423 ("[Clients inevitably suffer when their lawyers insist on
divorcing the professional encounter from the emotional underpinnings of the dispute involved. Client
dissatisfaction with legal representation often results from the lawyer's inability to see the client's
emotional self as anything but an impediment to sensible, rational management of the legal problem
221. See supra section I1(A)(2).
222. See, e.g., JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERTA. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 139 (1958) (proposing
a theory of rational choice in which an actor's decisions are based upon a model of the objective facts
whose elements are themselves affected by the psychological and sociological process); NEALE &
BAZERMAN, supra note 41, at 47-50 (cataloguing the effects of anchoring and adjustment on the
negotiation process).
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financial value analysis but also with the maximization of the client's
desired ends, the lawyer should intervene in the decisionmaking process.
At the same time, though, the lawyer should recognize that a client's stated
preference might be utility maximizing even if it diverges from expected
value analysis. If the lawyer suspects this to be the case, she should avoid
intervening in client decisionmaking to ensure that she does not talk the
client out of an appropriate decision.'
Lawyers, of course, are neither trained psychologists nor mind
readers. As the previous discussion suggests, in a vast array of instances
in which a client's expressed litigation preference deviates from expected
value analysis, the lawyer will be unable to determine whether the
deviation represents a different but stable set of preferences or a mistake.
We believe that, in these cases, the lawyer should steer a middle course
between indiscriminately attempting to influence client settlement decisions
and indiscriminately avoiding such a role. The lawyer should engage the
client in an interactive counseling process and may eventually want to
volunteer advice, but such advice should be accompanied by an explicit
description of the considerations underlying the advice and an explanation
of the considerations that suggest the client might not want to alter his
analysis despite the lawyer's urging. 4 The lawyer who shies away from
making recommendations altogether, or who makes them only when
pressed, risks abetting client mistakes; the lawyer who makes recommenda-
tions without providing sufficient explanation risks persuading clients to
abandon good decisions, in the sense that they maximize client utility, for
bad ones.'
Although the cognitive error approach is difficult to apply in
individual cases, it offers lawyers a compass with which to navigate the
murky waters of client counseling in the settlement context.2
223. Recall that the second group of Broken Promise subjects participating in the Lawyer Influence
experiments were significantly more likely than the original Broken Promise subjects to accept the
defendant landlord's settlement offer. See supra Part III. This suggests that lawyers can exert
substantial influence over their clients, even when the litigant seeks a different end than the lawyer, and
even when the lawyer limits her role to educating as opposed to advising.
224. The results of the Lawyer Influence experiments suggest that providing an explanation along
with a recommendation might reduce the likelihood that the client will follow the lawyer's advice. See
infra subpart III(C). Our recommendation that the lawyer provide such an explanation in difficult cases
reflects the need to balance the power of an unmitigated recommendation with the uncertainty of the
efficacy of that power.
225. See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 131, at 186 (suggesting that lawyers refrain from telling
clients what they think a client should do); Bundy, supra note 125, at 21 (discussing the tension
between the client's preferences and the lawyer's judgment in settlement decisionmaking); Simon, supra
note 128, at 213 (advocating the "informed consent" view as opposed to the paternalistic "best
interests" view).
226. By requiring the lawyer to attempt to evaluate whether, in any given circumstance, the
divergence between the lawyer's and the client's analysis of decision options reflects a cognitive error
or a nonmonetary preference, the cognitive error approach demands analytical and interpersonal skills
[Vol. 76:77
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V. Conclusion: The Legal System and Psychological Aspirations
Our experimental results support the hypothesis that lawyers, on
average, evaluate litigation options differently than litigants, with lawyers'
evaluations more likely to be consistent with the expected value analysis
presumed by economic models of litigation. Because the monetary cost of
trial-relative to settlement-is high, it follows that lawyers will favor
settlement more often than their clients. Assuming that lawyers have an
effect on their clients' litigation decisions, lawyers should be settlement-
promoting. This account, of course, is consistent with, and may partially
explain, the surprisingly high rate of settlement. Whether the lawyer
should attempt to persuade clients to alter their decisionmaking processes,
or alternatively, refrain from providing advice, depends on whether the
observed differences reflect alternative aspirations and values or merely
alternative means of seeking a commonly held set of goals. This means-
ends inquiry is critical to reaching normative conclusions about the proper
role of the lawyer in litigation decisionmaking.
This normative conclusion, though, is premised on the assumption that
the lawyer's sole responsibility is to serve the interests of his client,
bounded only by the explicit restrictions of the formal rules of legal
ethics. 7  This view of lawyering, often called the "libertarian
approach," contrasts with the "regulatory approach" to lawyering.?
that lawyers do not typically learn in law school and do not necessarily develop in practice. This fact
highlights the need to include at least a rudimentary review of basic cognitive psychology in the law
school curriculum, and, in fact, there appears to be a developing trend in this direction. See, e.g.,
Brest & Krieger, supra note 198, at 553-54 (arguing that to teach professional judgment law schools
must introduce students to the psychology of decisionmaking, among other topics traditionally ignored
in legal education); see also Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as
Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 10-11 (1995). As long as most
lawyers receive no formal training in psychology, the cognitive error approach to counseling will
stretch the boundaries of many lawyers' expertise, but the approach is justified nonetheless because it
offers skillful lawyers the best opportunity to maximize their clients' utility: securing settlements when
it is efficient to do so and seeking adjudication when settlement is undesirable. Cf. Dan W. Brock &
StevenA. Wartman, When Competent Patients Make Irrational Choices, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1595,
1598 (1990) (describing the physician's difficult role of attempting to respect the different weights
patients give to avoiding pain and suffering when making decisions about their treatment while
simultaneously trying to help patients overcome irrational fears that prevent them from pursuing
promising treatments).
227. Even those who ardently believe the lawyer must zealously represent his client to the
exclusion of other interests generally admit to some basic limits on the bounds of zealous
representation. Cf. Gordon, supra note 166, at 20 (noting that supporters of such a model of lawyering
concede that lawyers should not commit or help their clients to commit crimes, tell lies, or fabricate
evidence). It is commonly accepted that a "lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert
or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous," MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1995), nor take action on behalf of a client "merely to harass
or maliciously injure another." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7-102(A)(1)
(1980).
228. These precise terms are borrowed from William Simon. See William H. Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1085-90 (1988) (describing the libertarian and
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The regulatory approach does not deny the value of loyalty to the client,
but it requires the lawyer to balance such loyalty against a responsibility to
third parties, including the legal system or society in general. 9 Under
this conception of lawyering, 2  the observed differences between the
decisionmaking approaches of lawyers and litigants raise more complicated
ethical questions, which we can address only briefly in this Article.
Supporters of the regulatory approach, or some variation of it, object
to the libertarian approach on the ground that it permits a lawyer to use
procedural tools or an adversary's information deficit to prevail in litigation
even when the purposes underlying the substantive law would favor the
opposite result.Y'1 Our experiments do not implicate this ethical
dilemma; in all three hypothetical scenarios, the plaintiffs had at least
arguably meritorious claims and, thus, their lawyers had no cause to
question whether vigorously pursuing their client's causes overtly subverted
the legal system.
But when a client wishes to pursue even a meritorious claim to trial
rather than accept a settlement offer that his lawyer believes is financially
regulatory approaches as the two conventional models of ethical decisionmaking); see also Jamie G.
Heller, Note, Legal Counseling in the Administrative State: How to Let the Client Decide, 103 YALE
L.J. 2503, 2504 (1994) (attributing these labels to Simon).
229. See generally Gordon, supra note 166, at 10-12 (summarizing the dispute between attorneys
who believe the "guiding premise of the entire [legal] system" is "maintaining the integrity of rights-
guarding procedures" and those who believe "loyalty to client interests must be balanced against and
sometimes overridden by broad, more amorphous obligations, such as the lawyer's duties as 'officer
of the court,' member of a public profession, and citizen with a responsibility to uphold the rule of
law"); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV.
702, 705 (1977) (arguing that the role of lawyers as professionals requires that their ethical canons
reflect not only the interest of individual clients but also "the public interest in seeing justice done");
Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
370, 384 (rev. ed. 1954) (observing that a lawyer acts as a buffer between the desire of clients and the
social interest).
The disagreement over the role of the lawyer is generally philosophical, but arguments are
sometimes based on practical considerations as well. An example is the argument for the libertarian
position on the grounds that government institutions typically focus on the good of society, leaving
lawyers among the few who can focus on the good of individuals. See Kenney Hegland, Beyond
Enthusiasm and Commitment, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 805, 816 (1971) ("There are simply enough experts
and planners deciding the greatest good for the greatest number; once lawyers start playing that game,
the individual suffers the hazard of escalating dehumanization.").
230. This regulatory approach to lawyering finds some support in prevailing rules of ethics:
The basic legitimacy of some exercise of power by lawyers for the sake of third parties
is currently beyond question. After all, lawyers are required to refrain from suborning
perjury, even when their clients might help themselves by committing this crime. The
reason is that lawyers, even in the lawyer-client relationship, are under some duties, and
impose some duties on their clients, derived from obligations to the larger society.
Ellmann, supra note 173, at 773.
231. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 228, at 1098-99 (describing a scenario in which an insurance
defense attorney takes advantage of a plaintiff's attorney's ignorance of a change in the law to settle
a meritorious claim on terms favorable to the defense). Although Simon does not support a pure
version of the regulatory approach to lawyering, he advocates a related position that calls for lawyers
to promote justice rather than merely the interests of their clients. See id. at 1091-1119.
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advantageous, the lawyer who views himself as a public servant faces a
different, though equally difficult, dilemma. The resources necessary to
vindicate legal rights are scarce. 2  A client who rejects a settlement
offer and demands a trial of uncertain promise not only risks an
undesirable outcome for himself, but also appropriates the limited resources
of his attorney, the opposing party's legal counsel, a judge, other court
staff, and perhaps a jury.33  The lawyer who accepts the premise that
"some rights are more important than others" and believes that he has an
ethical obligation to represent clients with relatively meritorious or
"important" claims or both' must necessarily reassess the effort that
should be expended to prosecute a case for a client once that client has
received a financially fair settlement offer.3 5  If some cases are more
232. Despite the remarkably high rate of settlement, state and federal courts are backlogged. The
State Justice Institute, for instance, reported that state court caseloads are on the rise. According to
the Institute, "An extrapolation based on past trends suggests that many trial and appellate courts are
likely to see their caseloads double before the end of the decade . . . . [The public's demand for
services in many courts is outstripping available resources." BRIAN J. OSTROM Er AL., NATIONAL
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, at xi (1994);
see also Robert J. MacCoun et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution in Trial and Appellate Courts, in
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 95, 97 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) ("A major
impetus for the introduction of court-based ADR is the common perception that American courts are
experiencing a 'litigation explosion.'"); Michael D. Planet, Reducing Case Delay and the Costs of Civil
Litigation: The Kentucky Economical Litigation Project, in ABA ACTION COMM'N TO REDUCE COURT
COSTS AND DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY: PROJECT REPORTS AND RESEARCH
FINDINGS 3 (1984) ("The complaint commonly heard is that courts are experiencing increasing
difficulty managing caseloads growing both in volume and complexity."); George L. Priest, Private
Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 529 (1989) ("Litigation delay has
proven a ceaseless and unremitting problem of modem civil justice. Civil court delay has been the
central focus of serious and concentrated reform in the United States since the late-1950s .... Three
decades later, it is apparent that little, if any, progress has been made.").
233. The notion that settlement is often preferable to adjudication from a public perspective is
pervasive and reflected in rules of court. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give federal trial judges
the authority to require parties to participate in pretrial settlement conferences. See FED. R. CIV. P.
16(a)(5), (c)(9). See generally David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice
of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1985 (1989) (stating that "a major purpose" of the 1983
amendment of Rule 16 "was to recognize, and indeed to embrace, the strong trend toward increased
judicial management of litigation from an early stage of the lawsuit"). The Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990 encouraged courts to increase the use of settlement conferences and other alternative dispute
resolution procedures. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 § 103(a), 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(3)(A),
(a)(6), (b)(5) (1994).
Some have argued that the marginal costs of a single litigation are overestimated because a higher
rate of settlement would only encourage other disputes to make their way into the legal system. See
generally Bundy, supra note 125, at 48-49 (stating that "earlier settlement of cases may simply pave
the way for additional litigation"); Priest, supra note 232, at 535, 534-35 ("Reducing congestion and
delay increases the expected value of litigation and increases the volume of litigation.").
234. Simon, supra note 228, at 1092-94 (arguing that a lawyer should assess the relative merits
of a client's goals before devoting his scarce resources to representing that client).
235. Morgan classified "the expeditious resolution of disputes at the lowest practical cost" as an
interest related to but distinct from the public's interest in "seeing justice done." Morgan, supra note
229, at 705. Assuming that the amount of resources society is willing to devote to dispute resolution
HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  139 1997-1998
Texas Law Review
important than others, it must be true, for example, that the continued
prosecution of the BMW Driver's claim in the Automobile Accident
scenario becomes relatively less important once the defendant offers a
$21,000 settlement.2
36
Our experimental results suggest that clients might seek certain
psychological goods from the legal system, such as the sense of avoiding
a loss relative to a reference point or of not being taken advantage of by
their contractual partners, whereas attorneys are more focused on the goal
of redressing economic harm. Whether the lawyer is ethically permitted
or obligated to attempt to persuade a client to forego his aspirations
depends not only on the degree to which the lawyer must balance the
public good against his client's interests, but also on the interests the legal
system seeks to vindicate in a given dispute.
Without doubt, there are situations in which society intends for the
legal system to vindicate psychological or emotional desires. The tort of
libel, for example, provides a means of protecting one's reputation through
the invocation of the legal system. 7  But it is less clear that an auto-
mobile accident victim properly employs the legal system when he rejects
a settlement offer that is generous in light of the uncertainties of the case
because he prefers risk to absorbing a "loss" from a self-selected reference
point.
If such a use of the legal system is inappropriate given the system's
scarce resources, the lawyer who views his ethical role as one of public
servant might have a greater obligation to intervene in his client's decision-
making process than the lawyer who equates zealous advocacy with the
highest ethical standards." Even the lawyer who believes the legal
is relatively fixed in the short run, faster and lower-cost dispute resolution will lead to more justice
being done.
236. The prosecution of some cases to a final adjudication has greater positive than negative
externalities. For example, the public might benefit by having an important civil rights case of first
impression decided through adjudication rather than settled out of court. See generally Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). In the case of garden variety tort, contract, and
property disputes of the type described in our experimental scenarios, though, it is probably safe to
predict that an adjudication will not produce an important legal precedent and, consequently, the
decision to seek adjudication rather than settlement is likely to impose a net social cost.
237. See, e.g., David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL.
L. REV. 847, 881 (1986) (arguing that the "primary social interest in a libel action is to correct a
proven falsehood"); Bezanson, supra note 10, at 789 (noting that "the law of libel is supposed to
protect reputation"); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REv. 691, 691 (1986) ("The common law of slander and libel is designed to
effectuate society's 'pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon
reputation.'" (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966))); cf. Daniel W. Shuman, The
Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 KAN. L. REV. 39 passim (1994) (explaining the
psychological needs the tort system fulfills generally).
238. Louis Brandeis, for example, was well known for advising clients to resolve legal problems
in ways that comported with his view of the public good. See, e.g., PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D.
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system should serve only the interests of individual disputants should give
pause because all (or at least most) individual litigants are best served by
a legal system that efficiently settles disputes. 9  In short, given that
lawyers and clients seem to be affected differently by psychological phe-
nomena, and given that lawyers probably can influence to some degree the
impact of such factors on their clients, the legal system must confront the
relative merits of its use as a forum for the fulfillment of psychological
aspirations.
BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 96-99 (1984) (describing Brandeis's advice to a department store
owner to make workplace reforms in order to reduce labor strife).
239. This is true in the sense that if all prospective clients were hidden behind a Rawlsian veil of
ignorance to select rules governing litigation, they would likely select a system that required the
acceptance of settlement offers reasonably related to the value of litigation in order to save limited
resources for disputes in which no reasonable settlement is offered. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (arguing that if individuals were denied all knowledge of their position in life,
they would be forced to make decisions designed for the benefit of society as a whole); cf. Gilson,
supra note 123, at 875 (arguing for evaluating a client's interests by considering what she would have
wanted at the time the rules of litigation were chosen-that is, when she stood behind a Rawlsian veil
of ignorance-rather than by considering what she wants at the time she makes a litigation decision).
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